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ABSTRACT 
The past 50 years have seen a staggering amount of change in the technology and the 
business of process automation. The programmable logic controller (PLC) based control and 
monitoring system is a proven technology used to not only control processes but also to 
perform safety functions for processes in many industrial applications. There are many 
opportunities for improvements in any process or manufacturing system. One of the 
opportunities is achieving accurate safety function for measurement and process control to 
prevent human injury or death. The programmable electronic systems (PES) such as PLC 
systems are increasingly being used to perform safety functions as an integral part of the 
process or plant control system. A Robotic Manufacturing Cell is an example of a PES 
system and is used as an experimental setup for this work. The IEC 61508 standard defines 
various phases involved in the overall safety lifecycle for the PES system. This thesis study 
concentrates on such phases that include safety analysis methods, selection of an appropriate 
safety control system, implementation of safety as per the standard and safety validation. In 
this study four test cases are selected to perform safety analysis and implementation. It is 
verified how the conventional safety analysis method (FMEA) can be used to estimate the 
risk associated with each test case. As recommended by IEC 61508, a Risk-Graph method is 
used to calculate the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirement for each test case. A number of 
factors are required to be considered for selecting the appropriate safety control system 
architecture. After studying these factors and the safety analysis results, the Siemens safety 
PLC-based control system with SIL 3 configuration is selected for this application. IEC 
61508 also recommends implementation of independent control systems for normal operation 
   vi
and safety. This study demonstrates how two independent PLC based control systems, one 
for normal operations and other for safety-related functions, are implemented to offer the 
most effective solution for this application. This is achieved by using PLCs from two 
different manufacturers, a non-safety PLC for normal operations and a Siemens safety PLC 
for safety-related functions. This study focuses on Machine Safety, and it can be used as a 
guideline for implementation of functional safety in real-life manufacturing environment. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
The past 50 years have seen a staggering amount of change in the technology and the 
business of process automation. It is admitted that automation enables sophisticated process 
control and handling of unwanted errors without human interference[1]
.
 The programmable 
logic controller (PLC) based control and monitoring system is a proven technology used to 
not only control processes but also to perform safety functions for processes in many 
industrial applications. The PLC based distributed control system enables the engineer to 
gather information from all processes across the plant and control the operation from a 
central control room.  
 
There are many opportunities for improvements in any process or manufacturing system. 
One of the opportunities is achieving accurate safety function for measurement and process 
control to prevent human injury or death. The programmable electronic systems (PES) such 
as PLC systems are increasingly being used to perform safety functions as an integral part of 
the process or plant control system. New technological and industrial development has led to 
a demand for PLC based system to perform safety-related functions in many applications. 
 
Safety is defined by many researchers in various ways. According to K. C. Shen’s definition 
[1,2]
, “safety of a system is the probability that, when operating and/or residing under stated 
conditions, the system will not be injured significantly for a specified interval of time.” 
Safety in a process plant can influence the design of a process control system in such a 
manner that hazard to machinery and humans can be avoided. Traditional plant designs try to 
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reduce the risk by adding personal protective equipment and by applying standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) [3]. In a conventional environment, safety engineers are assigned to prove 
that an existing design is safe. If a safety engineer discovers significant safety problems late 
in the design process, correcting them can be very expensive and time consuming. Instead, a 
safety engineer can be involved at the early stages of the design to finalize the safety 
specifications.  
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is an agency of the United 
States Department of Labor. Its mission is to prevent work-related injuries, illnesses and 
occupational fatality by issuing and enforcing rules called standards for workplace safety and 
health[4]. In case of any regulatory violation, OSHA enforces penalties on the responsible 
authorities. Due to this, safety in the workplace has gained importance for every 
manufacturing industry.  
 
“Safety integrated” [5] is a term widely used by Siemens Automation and Drive (A&D) group 
to promote their safety concept. This concept allows engineers to use standard as well as 
safety components to create safety-integrated, cost-effective solutions depending on the 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirement. Siemens, being a pioneer in automation and control 
industries, has developed various products for machine and process control with proven 
technology. Having provided a variety of standard products known for their reliable 
operation, Siemens has developed and manufactured various components required in 
automation with safety incorporated in it. The safety-integrated product series include 
SIRIUS, SIGUARD, SIMATIC and SINUMERIK/SIMODRIVE products that are 
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configured to provide maximum protection against functional faults. The SIMATIC S7 
Distributed Safety is a safety related programmable system certified by TUV SUD (German 
Technical Inspectorate, SOUTH). This means that it is suitable for use in safety-related 
applications with high potential hazards and risks such as production systems, machinery 
construction, process technology and offshore processes. The certification is aligned to IEC- 
61508. 
 
IEC 61508 is a globally accepted standard and is used to implement functional safety for PES 
systems. This standard explains an overall safety lifecycle. This document can be used as a 
guideline for the design and implementation of a safety-related system. This thesis 
demonstrates how the IEC 61508 is used to develop a safety-related system by using Siemens 
safety products. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Overview 
It was found that the safety requirements for each process industry vary depending on their 
application, breadth and complexity. Any process plant consists of a large number of 
processes and each process is operated by using a number of mechanical, electrical and 
pneumatic components. The safety requirements are different for design and implementation 
of each component. The safety experts follow different standards to design and implement 
each of the above components. Automation is an essential component required to operate a 
process. In the academic literature, many topics related to safety control systems are 
discussed. These discussions include conventional methods of safety analysis, different types 
of failures, elements of safety, various configurations of control systems and IEC 61508 
safety standard and its application. A PLC based control system for safety is an emerging 
area and there are not many articles published in the academic literature yet. 
 
2.2 Conventional Methods of Safety Analysis and their 
Application 
Methods of safety analysis can be applied during the early designing stages of process 
automation. There are methodologies and procedures available for analyzing the hazards in 
the process industry that can be applied to other industries. A. Toola [1] has suggested that the 
conventional safety analysis methods can be applied to the safety design of a PLC-based 
control system. The author has reviewed many case studies on safety analysis methods used 
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for automation. The author has also listed scope, principles, advantages and shortcomings of 
various safety analysis methods such as:   
1) Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
2) Action error analysis (AEA) 
3) Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
4) Event tree analysis (ETA) 
5) Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
6) Reliability assessments 
 
Many researchers have studied and analyzed each method with respect to an industrial 
application and have listed its advantages and disadvantages. Few researchers have also 
shown that two or more methods can be used in combination for specific application. All 
these methods are summarized based on their scope and principles in Appendix 1[1,6,7,8,9,10]. 
 
2.2.1 Checklist 
Checklist[11] is one of oldest and simplest method used for hazard identification. A checklist 
is a list of questions about system organization, operation, maintenance and other areas of 
concerns. It can also help to determine appropriate actions required for hazard control. The 
implementation of checklist assures that various requirements are fulfilled and nothing is 
neglected or overlooked. Checklist is primarily based on the analyst’s prior experience. It can 
also be implemented based on codes and standards. The checklist is required to be 
maintained during the life of the project and updated after every major and substantial 
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modification. Although checklist requires relatively trained and experienced people, 
relatively untrained person can also use it effectively with adequate resources.  
 
A detailed qualitative assessment can be carried out by using number of checklists. B. K. 
Daniels and R. I. Wright [10]  have suggested few main headings for various checklists, such 
as Safety related functions, Operator interface, Plant interface, Physical environment, 
Maintenance and modifications. Each heading is followed by their subsidiary sections and 
questions. This method can be an extensive amount of work to cover all forms of failures. 
 
The main disadvantages of this technique [11,12] are as follows; 
• It takes a long time to develop a checklist. It yields qualitative results but no insight 
into the system. It just provides the status of each item in terms of ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ 
• A checklist can focus on only single item at a time. It cannot find hazards which are a 
result of interaction among different equipment. 
• Because it is required to be prepared by an experienced person, there is always a 
significant probability that some critical failures are being neglected.  
• It is not possible to identify the causes of hazards such as type of equipment 
operation, severity of operating conditions and any mis-operation. 
Due to above listed limitations, this method is not recommended for details risk 
assessment. 
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2.2.2 What-If Analysis 
The What-If method [12] involves asking a series of questions beginning with What If (not 
necessarily start with “What if”) as a means of identifying hazards. Apart from checklist, it is 
the oldest method of hazard identification and is still popular. What if analysis is performed 
with questions such as: 
- What if the pipe leaks? 
- What if the flow controller fails? 
This method essentially involves a review of the earlier design by a team using questions of 
this type, often using a checklist. The advantages of this technique are: 
• No specialized technique or computational tool is required. 
• Once the questions have been developed they can be used throughout the life of the 
project. 
• It provides a simple tabular summary. 
The major disadvantages are: 
• It is recommended to have a team of experts to perform the study. As a result it has 
disadvantage in terms of expertise availability and cost. 
• The heavy reliance on the experience and intuition of the study team implies that any 
limitations in this aspect of study can make the entire study useless. 
• It is not as systematic as HAZOP and FMEA. 
• It gives only qualitative results with no numerical prioritization. 
Due to these disadvantages, this technique can be used only when HAZOP and FMEA 
are not applicable or the cost of study is the main consideration. 
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2.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis[11] is the basis for a structured approach to failure analysis. It is an 
analytical tool that uses deductive reasoning to determine the occurrence of an undesired 
event. The technique begins with a top event that would normally be a hazardous event. Then 
the fault tree analysis is used to identify various single point failures, combinations of these 
failures and operating circumstances which could cause that event. The completed fault tree 
is a logical representation of all the combinations of basic event which cause the top event. 
Each basic event is considered as a Boolean variable, and the logic for top event can be 
represented as a Boolean expression[10]. By manipulating this expression, single point failures 
and minimum cut-sets are determined to identify various failure modes in PES.  
 
FTA provides quantitative information about failure modes and consequences. FTA has the 
following advantages[11,12]: 
• It allows the analyst to concentrate on one particular system failure at a time. 
• It makes it easy to identify single point failures. 
• It provides a graphical format which enables the analyst to visualize the hazard and its 
causes. 
• It is used for some control systems to incorporate the effects of feedback. 
• It can also handle multiple failures. 
 
Software fault tree[1] (SFTA) attempts to verify that the program will not, in any 
environment, allow a particular unsafe output to occur. 
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FTA is a well-accepted technique. Its main disadvantages are that developed fault trees can 
be very large and difficult to relate to the system and its operations. The results can be 
difficult to quantify. Its accuracy relies on the ability of the analyst to deduce what can cause 
an event. 
 
2.2.4 Failure Mode and Effect analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a systematic examination of the system to determine the effect of each mode of the 
failure of each part of the system. In this analysis, individual components such as pumps, 
valves and vessels are examined to identify the likely failures which could have undesired 
effects on the system operation[11]. FMEA is a qualitative inductive method and is easy to 
apply[10]. FMEA is executed by preparing the list of expected failure modes with respect to 
the use of the system, the elements involved, the mode of operation, the operation 
specifications, the time constraints and the environmental conditions. It can be applied at any 
level of breakdown of the system, e.g., sub-system, module or components. It has been 
recommended for use as a hazard identification technique mainly for systems dealing with 
low/ moderately hazardous operations and the one which can not support the expensive and 
time-consuming HAZOP[12]. When applied to PES systems, it is usually applied at functional 
block levels. In this approach, effects of each mode of failure of field sensors, actuators, 
operator interfaces, processors, I/O modules and communication interfaces are considered[13]. 
FMEA is good at identifying potentially hazardous single failures but normally does not 
consider multiple and simultaneous failures. 
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2.2.5 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
HAZOP was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the UK. It is a simple yet 
structured method for hazard identification and assessment. The basic principle of a HAZOP 
study is that normal and standard conditions are safe. The hazard occurs only when there is a 
deviation from the normal condition. The UK ministry of defense awarded a contract to 
Cambridge Consultant Limited working with Arthur D. Little and Redmill Consultancy to 
prepare a guideline on the application of the HAZOP to PES[14]. 
 
In a typical HAZOP study, design and operation documents such as piping and 
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), process flow diagrams (PFDs), material flow diagrams 
and operating manuals are examined systematically by a group of experts for identifying all 
possible deviations [15]. Once a HAZOP has identified all deviations, it searches for the cause 
of the deviation and tries to deduce the consequences of the deviation. To cover all possible 
malfunctions in the system the HAZOP team members are guided with a set of guide words 
for generating the process variable deviations. A list of guide words [8,12,14] and their 
definitions with respect to chemical industry and PES is given in Table 2.1. 
 
It can be observed from the above description of methods that no safety analysis method 
covers all aspects of safety design. Each method has its own targets and is applicable to 
specific problems. However, it is possible to find a combination of methods which is optimal 
for each design problem.  
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Guide 
Word 
Standard interpretation for 
chemical industry 
Example interpretation for PES 
None 
No part of the intention is 
achieved 
No data or control signal passed 
More Quantitative increase 
Data is passed at higher rate than intended or more 
data is passed 
Less Quantitative decrease 
Not used here because it is already covered by ‘part 
of’ 
As well 
as 
All design intent achieved but 
with additional results 
Not used here because it is already covered by ‘more’ 
Part of 
Only some of the intention is 
achieved 
The data or control signals are incomplete 
Reverse 
Covers reverse flow in pipes 
and reverse chemical reactions 
Normally not relevant 
Other 
than 
A result other than the original 
intention is achieved 
The data or control signals are complete but incorrect 
Early Not used 
The signal arrives too early with reference to clock 
time 
Late Not used 
The signal arrives too late with reference to clock 
time 
Before Not used 
The signal arrives earlier than intended within a 
sequence 
After Not used 
The signal arrives later than intended within a 
sequence 
 
Table 2.1: Guide word interpretation with respect to the chemical industry and a PES system. 
 
F. Redmill et al.[14] have suggested a combination of HAZOP and FMEA in hazard analysis. 
The two methods are complementary. When HAZOP is being carried out, there is often some 
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element of FMEA included in it, but if the difference between the two methods is 
understood, their effectiveness can be optimized. These methods can be briefly distinguished 
as follows; 
- A HAZOP is a team exercise, while FMEA can be performed by an individual. 
- HAZOP is used to identify both the causes and consequences of hazards while 
FMEA examines only the consequences of failures of each component. 
- In HAZOP, once the deviation from desired intent is found, the study proceeds 
further to identify possible causes and likely consequences of the deviation, whereas in 
FMEA, once the possible components failures are identified, a study proceeds further to 
determine the likely consequences on the system as a whole. 
 
When the hazard is a result of the deviation from design intent of either a component or 
interaction between components, neither the HAZOP nor FMEA alone can cover all possible 
hazards. However, when HAZOP provides a possible deviation from design intent as an 
interaction between components and possible cause as a failure of one of the components, 
FMEA can be applied further to investigate the possible causes of failure of that component. 
In another way, when the component is a subsystem and FMEA has recognized a possible 
failure mode, HAZOP can be applied on more detailed design representation to understand 
the interaction within the components of a subsystem. Therefore, it is possible to improve the 
efficiency of hazard analysis by carrying out first HAZOP and then FMEA or vice versa. 
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2.3 Elements of Failure 
All of the above mentioned safety analysis methods consider three basic elements in safety 
assessment. These are causes of failure, probability of failure and consequences of failure. 
The causes of failure can be divided into two categories: the systematic failures and 
stochastic failures[1]. Examples of systematic failures are software errors, errors in design, 
specifications, construction, operation and maintenance. Examples of stochastic failures are 
failures due to the aging of mechanical components and random failure of electronic 
components. Probability of failure is the likelihood that the system will fail. It also defines 
the rate at which the equipment may fail during its lifecycle. The likelihood is classified as 
high, medium or low rate of occurrence. This is often determined based on company 
operating experience or industry-wide operation history [6]. The consequences are defined as 
the effects of failure on human life, property or the environment.  
 
Angela Summers[6] has indicated in her study that once the HAZOP safety analysis is 
completed, risk associated with the severity and likelihood should be understood. The event 
severity is determined based on its anticipated consequences and impacts. This can include; 
 
1. On-site Consequences 
- worker injury or death 
- equipment damage 
2. Off-site Consequences 
- community exposure, including injury and death 
- property damage 
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3. Environmental Impact 
- emission of hazardous chemicals 
- contamination of air, soil and water supplies 
- damage to environmentally sensitive areas 
 
The occurrence of a failure does not cause the hazard. Typically, a specific state of the 
process and/ or a combination of failures is needed for a hazard to occur. Multiple failures 
may occur simultaneously, and it is difficult to predict the behavior of a control system in 
such a scenario. The automation engineer can affect the probability and severity of accidents 
by applying hazard analysis methods. Each hazard analysis method is applicable for different 
categories of hazards. Sometimes it is necessary to use two or more methods simultaneously 
to cover all possible hazards. Risk reduction methods can be applied at various stages of 
failure as presented in figure 2.1 [1]; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Opportunities for risk reduction. 
 
. 
The above figure represents various stages through which a failure goes before it causes the 
hazardous consequences. There are many opportunities for an engineer to reduce the risk. 
The potential causes of an accident which exist in automation can be eliminated, or their 
Causes Hazard Accident Consequences
Minimizing the 
probability of the 
causes
Control actions to 
prevent the hazard
Control actions and 
operator support to 
prevent the accident
Control actions to 
restrict the 
consequences
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probability can be minimized. A feedback from all stages can be fed back to the system to 
minimize the probability of the causes. Systematic failures can be minimized by designing 
procedures, by management actions, by having skilled and experienced designers and by 
having thorough testing. Stochastic failures can be minimized by using adequate quality 
components, by aging procedures and by testing procedures for redundant components. 
Redundancy at component and/ or architectural level can be provided. It is also possible to 
prevent the unsafe state by designing countermeasures for hazards by which the system can 
be brought back to safe state. This can be done by designing alarms, using automatic control 
actions, designing fail-safe systems, and interlock and trip systems and emergency shutdown 
systems. It may be possible to control unsafe state or the consequences of the hazard and to 
minimize them so to keep the process in a state which, though an unsafe state, still prevents 
any more harm from occurring. This can be done by means of safety protection equipment or 
by keeping people and material out of hazardous area [1]. 
 
A. Toola has presented various cases on accidents caused by the automation system. He 
reviewed literature on accidents by various researchers [1]. All of the above cases include the 
safety analysis on automation failures. These researchers have mostly used hazard and 
operability studies, fault tree analysis and failure mode effect analysis methods for analyzing 
effects of automation failures. It is also identified that the safety of automated control 
systems should include safety-of-application software. Software fault tree analysis (SFTA) is 
an extended FTA which can be used for application software. In this method, the “TOP” 
event is critical software fault, and the software is studied backward through the program to 
the software input. A. Toola has indicated in his safety analysis study that some methods do 
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not study multiple failure situations systematically. The simultaneous occurrence of failures 
of different types, for example, a human error in connection with a component failure, are 
difficult to study with a single safety analysis method. An automation engineer is required to 
use two or more safety analysis methods to cover various types and combination of failures. 
Safety analysis provides a practical way for automation engineers to discuss systematically 
with operators and process engineers the intended and unintended functions and states of a 
process. 
 
According to Toola’s accident studies [1], an important feature in automation safety is the 
information on process states provided to the operator. The safety analysis methods do not 
consider this aspect explicitly, but they provide information on the process disturbances 
which might lead to the unsafe states during operation. Only Action Error Analysis (AEA) 
has a comment on it, by asking in what way the operator notices his or her mistake. This 
information can be used to design the operator interface such as Human machine interface 
(HMI) application to keep the operator updated with latest state of the process. The HMI with 
real-time status updates is provided as an integral part of the automated control system. 
Figure 2.2 shows the various stages of failure caused by unintended event in human activity, 
in the technical equipment or in the environment [1].  
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Figure 2.2: Various stages of failure caused by an unintended event. 
 
 
2.4 Different Configurations of Automated Control Systems 
The safety of a manufacturing process is based on the process design itself. The design of the 
process should define the number of possible unsafe states and their probability of 
occurrence. Many safety features can be implemented with the aid of automated control 
system. The objective of the automated control system is to keep the process in a safe state to 
prevent an accident and/ or to transfer the process back to a safe state in case of failure. The 
automated control system can be designed by using solid-state relay logic, embedded 
controller, microprocessor, PC based control cards or PLC. The PLC-based control system 
designed for safety has a fail-safe operation mode [7,16]. The purpose of a fail-safe system is 
to bring the controlled process to a pre-defined “safe state” in case of failure. The operation 
of the fail-safe system can be triggered by detecting quality concerns, environmental 
constraints, hazardous conditions or other unacceptable operational parameters. The PLC 
based control system can also be configured for fault tolerant operations. The fault-tolerant 
systems [16,17] have internal redundant components and integral logic for identifying and 
bypassing faults without affecting the output. Redundant systems have individually specified 
secondary components. A hardwired or software means are provided in PLC system for 
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detecting failure of the primary device. When the PLC system detects the failure of a primary 
device, it switches its control to the secondary device automatically.  
 
Redundancy improves the availability of the system. The PLC can be configured in various 
ways to achieve redundancy at various levels. Some examples include Hot-Standby and 
Warm-Standby configurations for redundancy at CPU levels, redundancy at power supplies, 
voting logics (1oo2, 2oo3) for redundancy at I/O and field device levels, redundant industrial 
Ethernet network for redundancy at communication level and Triple Modular Redundant 
(TMR) systems for redundancy at all levels. Hot standby PLC system contains two CPUs 
connected in parallel configuration. A hardware module is provided to perform the 
switchover in case of failure of the primary CPU. The switchover time generally takes 
approximately 13-48 milliseconds. Warm-standby PLC system contains two CPUs connected 
in parallel configuration. A software program is loaded in the CPU to detect the failure and to 
perform the switchover. When the failure of the primary CPU is detected by a software code, 
entire data is transferred into the secondary CPU memory and secondary CPU takes the 
control of the system. The switchover time in this case is approximately 500-1000 
milliseconds and depends on the amount of data needed to be transferred. Redundant I/Os 
can be achieved in two ways. They can be done by using redundant sensors or actuators in 
the field or by using redundant sensors/ actuators with redundant I/O modules in the PLC 
system. Voting logic can be implemented to acquire information from these redundant 
sensors. This logic can be executed by using external voting electronic hardware or by using 
PLC I/O modules with built-in setting such as 1oo2 or 2oo3. In case of 1oo2 (one out of two 
channels) selection, the discrepancy period is monitored between two channels. If the status 
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of both channels is switched to the same state within the discrepancy period, the resulting 
status is read and stored in the CPU memory. If the status of both the channels is switched to 
same state beyond the discrepancy period, the fault is generated. The discrepancy period is 
decided based on internal circuit response time and the field device response time. Similarly, 
2oo3 (two out of three channels) is implemented. Triple modular redundant (TMR), as the 
name suggests, has three redundant hardware modules. The switchover is performed similar 
to the Hot-standby system but has an additional level of redundancy. The goal of a TMR 
system is to provide fail-safe control in a fault tolerant mode. This allows the system to 
continue while any single fault is detected, diagnosed, isolated and repaired before the 
second fault can occur [16]. The availability of the TMR system is always more than the Hot-
standby or Warm-standby PLC system. TMR systems are being used in highly critical 
applications such as nuclear reactor control. Redundant networks are implemented by using 
two Ethernet cards with each PLC. Both cards are configured for two independent networks. 
In case of one ethernet card failure, redundant card takes over the network control. HMIs are 
configured to automatically switch over to the available network addresses so that the real-
time information is always available for the operator. “Managed Industrial Ethernet 
switches” are used for forming Redundant and/or Ring Ethernet network. Moxa technologies 
provide managed switches which can recover the network from failure within 20 
milliseconds. 
 
Reliability of the control system is often confused with safety [18]. Reliability is a measure of 
the “up-time” or availability of the system. It is normally measured with the Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). MTBF is a statistical measure 
   22
of probability of failure. MTBF numbers represent a statistical approximation of how long a 
set of devices should last before failure. It does not mean that the device is tested for long 
time interval. MTBF numbers are generally created by estimating the MTBF of individual 
components and by past experience with similar products. Generally, manufacturers of 
industrial components or equipment provide the MTBF information for the user. Some 
methods are available that can be used to reduce the system down-time by increasing the 
MTBF value for example, conformal coating for printed circuit boards (PCBs) used in a 
system. A standard MIL-I-46058C specifies the conformalcoating requirement for Electrical/ 
Electronic Printed Circuit Assemblies. The conformal-coated modules last longer compared 
to standard modules in corrosive environment. If a process plant is situated near coastal area, 
this standard can be used as a design specification for PLC control system. A redundancy is 
one of the design approaches that increases the availability as discussed above. Another 
approach is to provide partial system functioning. In this case, operations that are critical to 
the production are still running, even if other processes are shut down due to the fault. MTBF 
and MTTR values are used to measure the availability of the system according to the 
following formula [16]. 
 
 A = MTBF/ (MTBF + MTTR)  -------------------------------------------------------(2.1) 
 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is a composite of other terms such as Mean Time To 
Diagnose (MTTD) and the Mean Repair Time (MRT). If the system is designed for fail-safe 
control, then the MTTD is zero, as it causes the system shutdown by bringing the entire 
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system in a pre-defined safe state immediately after fault is detected [16]. Figure 2.3 shows the 
effect of safety on the % MTTR of the system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The effect of safety on the % MTTR of the system[16]
. 
 
2.5 International Standards for Functional Safety of the Control 
System and Their Applications 
According to a functional safety application study done by H. Kanamaru et. al, there are two 
methods of decreasing the risk in process automation [19]. One is intrinsic safety and the other 
is functional safety. In intrinsic safety, the workers and machines are separated physically by 
a guard or a barrier. In functional safety, the safety control system stops the process when it 
detects anyone intruding into hazardous area or when it diagnoses any fault. The functional 
safety system needs a combination of safety input devices, safety circuit and safety output 
devices. Functional safety is a part of overall safety that depends on a system or equipment 
operating correctly in response to its input. 
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Currently, there are many standards available for the planning, construction and operation of 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS). In the European Union, manufacturers of such systems 
could refer to safety standards such as DIN/VDE 19250, DIN/VDE 19251, DIN/VDE 801, 
EN 298 and EN 954. The design of control system for safety functions can be described 
using these standards. Since many countries have different standards which are used for 
different applications, a globally applicable IEC 61508 [20,21,22] basic standard was developed 
and adopted. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the world's leading 
organization that prepares and publishes International Standards for all electrical, electronic 
and related technologies - collectively known as "electrotechnology." The IEC has issued 
standards for electricity and electronics, supporting safety and performance, the environment, 
electrical energy efficiency and renewable energies. The IEC also manages conformity 
assessment systems that certify that equipment, systems or components conform to its 
International Standards. 
 
IEC 61508 standard is concerned with functional safety achieved by safety-related systems 
that are primarily implemented in electrical and/ or electronic and/ or programmable 
electronic (E/ E/ PE) technologies, i.e., E/ E/ PE safety-related systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Standards used for functional safety[21]
. 
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As shown in the figure 2.4, the IEC 61508 standard is very generic and applies to all safety-
related systems irrespective of the application sectors such as process industries, 
manufacturing industries, transportation, medical etc. IEC 61508 is also used as a foundation 
to develop safety standards applicable to other industrial sectors. For example, IEC 61511 is 
applicable to the process industry, IEC 61513 is applicable to the nuclear industry and IEC 
62061 is applicable to machine safety.  
 
Some key features covered in IEC 61508 standard [23,24] for a safety assessment are as 
follows:  
1. Uses of a risk-based approach to determine safety integrity requirements of E/ E/ PE 
safety-related systems and including a number of examples of how this can be done. 
2. Uses of an overall safety lifecycle model as the technical framework for the activities 
necessary for ensuring functional safety is achieved by the E/ E/ PE safety-related 
systems. 
3. Uses of the safety life-cycle activities from initial concept through hazard analysis 
and risk assessment, development of the safety requirements, specifications, design 
and implementation, operation and maintenance and modification, to final 
decommissioning and/ or disposal. 
4. Includes the systems and sub-systems designed to perform safety functions and 
failure modes for each component included in these systems.  
5. Specifies requirements for both preventing failures and controlling failures. 
6. Specifies the techniques and measures that are necessary to achieve required safety 
integrity. 
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IEC 61508 standard has seven-part framework (Appendix 2) that specifies the procedural 
steps to be performed during the design of the safety system. According to the IEC 61508, 
the first step in determining requirements for E/ E/ PE safety-related system is risk 
assessment. The risk assessment methods mentioned earlier are classified into two major 
categories. One is quantitative method and the other is qualitative method [21]. 
 
Quantitative methods are often used when there is limited historical information available 
about the process. These methods require a thorough understanding of the potential causes of 
failure and its estimated probability. The probability of failure is the rate at which a 
hazardous event can occur without existing protective measures multiplied by the effect of 
the event. The probability of failure can be estimated by analyzing the rate of failure in 
similar situations, by referring to historical records or by using analytical methods. The fault 
tree analysis (FTA) is an example of a quantitative method. 
 
In qualitative method, a risk can be calculated based on the extent of damage (C) and the 
frequency of occurrence of the damage (H). The frequency of occurrence of the damage is a 
function of three elements: 
a. The exposure to hazardous area (A) 
b. The possibility of avoiding the hazard (G) 
c. The probability of the unwanted event without any protective equipment (W).  
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Figures 2.5 and 2.6 represent how the quantitative method is used to determine the risk 
according to the IEC 61508 standard. IEC 61508 standard includes the Risk-Graph and 
associated safety integrity levels [20,21,25]. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Various levels of A, G, W and C considered to determine the SIL[21]
. 
 
 
 
This standard also describes four levels of safety integrity for the safety-related equipment. 
Safety integrity level (SIL 1) is the lowest level of safety integrity and SIL 4 is the highest 
that can be achieved with E/ E/ PE system. For example, the following table 2.2 shows how 
to determine the SIL level based on different values of four variables (C, A, G and W). 
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Figure 2.6: Determination of SIL according to the “qualitative method” [21]
. 
 
Variables Value Level 
Extent of damage, C Cb Severe injury or death of a person 
Duration of stay of a person in the 
dangerous area, A 
Ab Frequent to permanent 
Aversion of danger, G Gb Hardly possible 
Probability of occurrence, W W3 Relatively high 
SIL level required SIL 3  
 
Table 2.2: An example of SIL calculation using a risk graph. 
 
An automated control system has to be configured to achieve the required safety integrity 
level. The instrumented system (SIS) is examined in its entirety for SIL levels. To achieve 
required SIL, entire SIS has to be examined. All components of SIS, from sensors to 
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actuators, are investigated for the failure probabilities (PFDs) for calculating final SIL. In 
actual practice, the physical connection and/or bus communication is also considered in the 
final SIL calculation. 
 
The safety integrity levels and associated range of probability of failure on demand is 
specified in the IEC 61508 standard [6,7,20,21,23]. 
 
Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL) 
Probability of Failure on Demand 
SIL 4 >= 10-5 to > 10-4 
SIL 3 >= 10-4 to > 10-3 
SIL 2 >= 10-3 to > 10-2 
SIL 1 >= 10-2 to > 10-1 
 
Table 2.3: SIL levels and associated range of PFD 
 
In earlier days, the conventional PLCs were used with external relay logic to achieve the 
required safety function. This requires a lot of engineering, verifications, testing, validation 
and commissioning efforts. As the safety requirements become more critical, the system 
becomes more complex and so does the engineering and commissioning efforts. The study 
done by T. A. Walczak shows that field devices such as sensors and actuators outside of the 
PLC based control system hardware constitute the majority of failures within the overall 
control system architecture [16]. 
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Figure 2.7: Control System Failure Topology by T. A. Walczak[16]
. 
 
 
The implementation of functional safety in an automated control system ensures that the 
failures at sensor and actuator levels are detected and diagnosed within the safety time limit 
to achieve the overall safety of the system. 
 
2.6 Introduction to Safety PLC, I/O and Safety Sensors 
The manufacturers of the programmable logic controller systems have realized the 
importance of safety in early 1990’s. Manufacturers like Rockwell, Siemens and GE-Fanuc 
have designed and developed PLC systems which meet the safety-related functional 
requirements as per the IEC 61508 standard. This new series of product is called safety-
PLC[17,18,19,26,27]. A safety PLC provides high reliability and high safety via special 
electronics, special software and pre-engineered redundancy. A safety PLC has I/O circuits 
that are designed to be fail-safe with built-in diagnostics and read-back capabilities. The CPU 
of the safety PLC has built-in diagnostics for memory, CPU operation, watchdog timer and 
PLC- CPU
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all communication systems. The extensive diagnostics make it possible for the automation 
engineer to troubleshoot highly complicated installations. It is also possible to design the 
countermeasure so that the entire process can be completely or partially shut down in case of 
failure. Few safety PLCs also offer muting mechanism which can be used to switch off the 
safety features conveniently during maintenance or troubleshooting activities[28]. Built-in 
redundant architecture increases the availability of the system ensuring that it is operating in 
safe state. The feature of diagnosing fault to its last connection level makes it easy for the 
plant engineer to maintain and repair the widely spread distributed control system.  
 
Safety PLCs are supplied with engineering tools for safety programming. The safety PLCs 
can be programmed by using five languages certified by IEC 1131-3 application 
programming standard. Manufacturers also provide library of safety-certified standard 
program blocks for ready to use. These software blocks are capable of monitoring and 
updating safety input and output at very high speed in the CPU memory. Safety PLCs can be 
configured with standard PLCs in one control system. In industrial practice, the normal 
process control is performed by standard PLC and safety PLC is used to perform highly 
critical functions. Both PLCs can interact with each other on safety network and thus reduce 
the ambiguity in process control decisions. With specially developed hardware and software 
engineering tools, it is possible to configure the safety control system in various ways to meet 
the system safety requirements. This has made it possible to minimize the cost of the entire 
control system to a great extent. 
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Moreover, safety PLCs are tested for certification of agreement to the safety standards from 
national research institutes or safety inspection companies such as TÜV[29]. TÜV Group is a 
European Notified Body, authorized to certify to EU Directives (Machinery, Elevators, Low-
Voltage, Pressure equipment and EMC) in European Union, US and Canada. TÜV Industrial 
Services GmbH, Automation, Software and Information Technology, (ASI) has a testing 
laboratory which is accredited for various operating ranges by different organizations. ASI 
performs type-approval testing and certifications on behalf of the manufacturer. The purpose 
is to ensure that the manufactured product includes sufficient functional safety according to 
the intended Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). TÜV Group takes the requirements of national 
and international standards such as IEC 61508 into consideration and ensures the product's 
suitability for the intended application area. The services of TÜV are used worldwide by 
business and government contractors. 
 
The integration of safety and automation becomes an easy task with safety PLC. The 
automation design engineers are taking advantage of specially designed safety PLCs: 
• Save startup costs. 
• Reduce downtime. 
• Improve flexibility of the system design. 
• Improve maintenance and operational capabilities. 
• Reduce damage recovery costs in case of industrial accident. 
• Improve productivity by providing safe work environment for equipment and 
workers. 
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• Eliminate hardwiring safety circuits which equates to savings in wiring, engineering 
and maintainability.  
 
IEC 61508 guidelines also suggests designing the automation system by using safety certified 
components. This guideline assures that all possible faults, random errors and systematic 
failures have been reviewed to achieve the required safety integrity level. The 
implementation of the automation system can be well documented with all its hazard 
analysis, design revisions, document change control revisions, approvals, test results, 
drawings, specification and verification and validations. All of the above are applicable for 
hardware components as well as software.  
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Problem Statement 
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3. Problem Statement 
Most of the hazard analysis methods are applied to the process industries. However, there is 
an opportunity to extrapolate these concepts to automation systems. IEC 61508 safety 
standard is a generic standard that provides a framework applicable to all PES based 
applications. PLC-based automated control systems are examples of PES systems. IEC 
61508 standard mainly deals with “Functional Safety” and it also provides a guideline for the 
hazard analysis in order to identify possible failure modes and their consequences.  
 
There is no reported evidence in the literature on how the results of the hazard analysis 
methods are used for designing the safety-based automated control systems. The aim of this 
work is to conduct experiments and draw conclusions on how this information can be used. 
This work will focus on identifying potential functional safety needs in an automated 
manufacturing system, using methods proposed in IEC 61508 standard. This information will 
be used to identify and analyze unique safety performance improvements that can be 
implemented using safety PLC, instead of a traditional non-safety PLC. 
 
The implementation requirements will be derived after analyzing possible failures. These 
failures will be derived from functional safety needs. These failures will serve the purpose of 
the test scenarios. Once the failures are identified, the hazard analysis method will be applied 
on each failure to identify possible causes and consequences. Each cause will be analyzed 
independently and collectively to list the design recommendations for the safety control 
system. The guidelines from IEC 61508 standard will be used to establish the control system 
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design and achieve the desired level of safety as determined by the hazard analysis. The 
results of the hazard analysis will be used to compare the performance of the control system 
before and after the implementation of the safety system. Finally, performance of the control 
system will be compared for its fault response, fail-safe operation, troubleshooting 
capabilities and ease of safety function engineering.  
 
The design and implementation of the safety system will take into consideration various 
factors such as the intended application, available safety technology, safety integrity level 
requirements and the cost of the system. This will enable the selection of the appropriate 
safety control architecture for a given application. Manufacturers of safety systems promote 
integrated control solutions in their product offering. These manufacturers offer both general 
purpose and safety controls in the same controller. This approach may not be the most 
effective solution for some applications. This research work uses the guideline provided by 
IEC 61508 standard, to implement two independent but integrated systems one for process 
control and one for safety. The uniqueness is in the investigation of how two independent 
systems, from two different manufacturers can be integrated into one application.  
 
The implementation and the integration will be demonstrated by using a Robotic cell consists 
of three IBM Robotic stations, a conveyor and a DVT vision system. All equipment are 
monitored and controlled by a non-safety PLC and five distributed I/O modules. The 
RSView-based Human Machine Interface (HMI) is provided to control and monitor the 
operation of this assembly line remotely.  
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The scope of this thesis will be limited to two Robotic stations and a conveyor. These 
systems will be analyzed for functional safety needs. Once the failure modes with respect to 
each functional safety need are identified, the Failure Mode Effect Analysis and Risk-Graph 
Analysis will be applied to determine possible causes and consequences of each failure 
mode. The results of the FMEA and Risk-Graph Analysis will be used to design the 
specifications of the safety control system. A Siemens safety PLC series will be used to 
achieve the desired safety specifications. It includes Safety certified PLC, I/O modules, 
sensors and actuators. It also includes IEC 1131-3 certified PLC programming software with 
safety certified programming modules.  
 
Two different automated control system architectures will be compared for the system 
performance one with the non-safety control system and other with the Siemens safety 
control system. Various faults will be generated in both control systems to observe the 
system response with respect to safety. An attribute analysis will be performed to compare 
these responses, and the appropriate conclusions will be derived. Furthermore, this work can 
be used as a guideline to analyze, design, implement and validate safety-related functional 
needs for an industrial manufacturing application. 
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Chapter 4 
Experimental Setup for “Before Case” 
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4. Experimental Setup for “Before  
Case” 
 
4.1 Description of the System  
The Robotic assembly line is located in the Robotic automation laboratory in Center of 
Integrated Manufacturing Systems. This assembly line is designed to produce the written 
paper product. The materials fed to this assembly line are stacks of paper and three pens of 
different colors. The assembly line is designed to write three letters by using selected pen 
color on a paper substrate. This line is composed of three Robotic stations, a conveyor line, 
vision system and two material feeder stations. The system is controlled by a non-safety 
Ethernet based PLC with the remote I/O modules. Figure 4.1 shows the schematic of the 
Robotic manufacturing cell and its main components. 
 
This assembly line is divided into seven stations.    
a. Station 0: This is the start station. When the conveyor is started, a stopper blocks all the 
pallets. A proximity sensor checks for the proper orientation of the pallet. If the pallet has 
the proper orientation, the stopper releases it after a predefined time. If the pallet is 
disoriented, the stopper does not release the pallet. 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the “Before Case” Robotic Manufacturing Cell. 
Robot-1
Controller 
Robot-2
Controller 
Robot-3
Controller 
ROBOT-
1
ROBOT-
2
ROBOT-
3
Allen-Bradley
PLC system
Paper
Feeder 
Station
Remote 
I/O-2
Remote 
I/O-1
Remote 
I/O-4
Remote 
I/O-6
Remote 
I/O-3
ETH S/W
P
e
n
H
o
l
d
e
r
Remote I/O
TCP/ IP
Conveyor Assembly line 
RSView
HMI Station 
Teach 
Panel
Teach 
Panel
Teach 
Panel
Vision 
System
Motor
Pallet at Station 0
Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 Station 4
P
e
n
H
o
l
d
e
r
P
e
n
H
o
l
d
e
r
 
   41
b. Paper Feeder Station: This station is built with a container which holds multiple paper 
stacks. A pair of photoelectric beam sensors monitors the level of paper in the container. 
These sensors give a paper empty signal as soon as the paper level drops below the 
reorder quantity. This station is installed within the Robot 1 work-envelope. 
 
c. Station 1: This station is dedicated to the Robot 1 operations. As soon as the pallet 
arrives at this station, it is detected by a proximity sensor. This sensor activates a stopper 
which blocks the pallet. The stopper at station 1 remains activated when the Robot 1 is in 
operation or a pallet is present at station 2. After a predefined time, a clamp is actuated to 
hold the pallet. Simultaneously, the start signal is sent to the Robot 1 controller. This 
signal triggers the Robot 1 control program. The Robot 1 extends its arm to the paper 
feeder station and grasps a paper and places it on the pallet. At the end of this operation, 
Robot 1 provides a done signal which is used to release the pallet from station 1, and 
Robot 1 waits for the next pallet. 
 
d. Pen Feeder Station: This station has a capacity to hold three pens for Robot 2 operation. 
Three pairs of photoelectric beam sensors detect the presence or absence of the pens. 
These signals are sent to the PLC for evaluation. This station is installed within the Robot 
2 work-envelope. 
 
e. Station 2: This station is dedicated to the Robot 2 operations. Once the pallet is released 
from station 1, it is detected by a proximity sensor. This activates the stopper to block the 
pallet. This stopper remains activated when the Robot 2 is in operation or the pallet is 
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present at Station 3. Once the pallet is detected, a clamp is actuated and a start signal is 
sent to Robot 2 controller. When the “Pen color” and “Data to Print” is entered from the 
HMI screen, Robot 2 picks the pre-selected pen and writes three selected characters. At 
the end of this operation, Robot 2 places the pen back to its original position on the pen 
feeder and releases the pallet.  
 
f. Station 3: This station is dedicated to the visual inspection system. The vision system 
captures the image and performs an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) function. The 
vision system provides OCR results in a string format and sends it to the PLC. The PLC 
compares the OCR data with the expected outcome and generates a pass/fail signal 
depending on the comparison. At the end of this operation, the pallet is released from 
station 3. 
 
g. Station 4: This station is dedicated to Robot 3 operations. When the pallet arrives at 
station 4, it is detected by a proximity sensor which activates a stopper. Simultaneously, a 
start signal is sent to the Robot 3. Based on the pass/fail signal generated by station 3, 
Robot 3 places the paper in the “good” or “bad” stack. 
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4.2 Components 
4.2.1 Robot 1, Robot 2 and Robot 3 
Introduction:  
IBM 7545 Robot is an electronically-driven, microprocessor-controlled system that offers 
speed and repeatability for flexible automation applications. A DOS based personal computer 
is used as a programming device for this system. A programming language called A 
Manufacturing Language/ Entry (AML/ Entry) is used for writing the programs. Thus, 
system consists of three major components: 
A. Manipulator. 
B. Controller. 
C. Operator Control Panel. 
 
A. Manipulator 
The manipulator is a two-jointed arm structure with four degrees of freedom. The joints of 
the arm, called Theta 1 (X) axis and Theta 2 (Y) axis, provide two degrees of freedom 
through their swivel motion. The end-of-arm rotation, called the Roll axis (r), provides a 
third degree of freedom. The end-of-arm also provides a fourth degree of freedom through a 
vertical motion (Z axis). The end-of-arm provides air connection to a pneumatic gripper.  
 
The end-of-arm mounting head, called end-effector is removable so different types of 
fixtures can be attached for various operations. The end-effector on the Robot 1 is designed 
to hold two vaccum cups. These cups grasp and release the paper substrate. The end-effector 
on the Robot 2 is designed with a mechanical fixture to grasp and release the pen. 
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The manipulator movement within the four degrees of freedom produces an area which is 
called work envelope. The work envelope is set differently for each Robot depending on its 
Theta 1 (X) and Theta 2 (Y) axes orientations. The work envelope for Robot 1 covers the 
Paper feeder station and Station 1 on the conveyor. The work envelope for Robot 2 covers 
the Pen feeder station and Station 2 on the conveyor. 
 
B. Controller 
The controller contains most of the electronics to control the manipulator. A microprocessor 
coordinates the manipulator’s movement and monitors its speed and positioning. Peripheral 
devices are synchronized with the manipulator through the use of digital input (DI) and 
digital output (DO) ports. The digital input ports monitor open/ close switches (DI) external 
to the system and the digital output ports operate relays (DO) allowing events to occur. The 
controller receives and stores its control program from the DOS based personal computer and 
then drives the manipulator by executing the program. The application program provides the 
instructions to the controller as to which ports to monitor, the amount of time to wait for the 
event and the type of condition to expect. The three main boards inside the controllers are: 
1. CPU Board: The CPU board contains a microprocessor, storage, interface circuits and 
communication circuits. 
2. Motor Control Board: It contains the roll microprocessor and circuits to control the 
movement as directed by the CPU. It keeps track of movements through the use of 
inputs from the manipulator. 
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3. Relay Board: The relay board contains relays, power distribution and interface 
circuits. 
 
The controller has three connectors which allow interface with external devices. These 
connectors are: 
 
Connector C1: Communication port 
The 25-pin D-type connector on the controller with the label C1 RS232C is the connector for 
the communication interface. Communication between the personal computer and Robot 
controller is accomplished by using RS 232 interface. The asynchronous communication line 
protocol is used with following characteristics: 
1. Full duplex transmission with a half-duplex (flip/flop) end-to-end user protocol. 
2. Baud Rate = 9600. 
3. Parity = None. 
4. Data Bits = 8. 
5. Stop Bits = 1. 
 
The AML/ Entry software allows the selection of communication port (COM1 or COM2) for 
the program load/ unload. All other communication port settings are done in COM port 
properties of the personal computer. Once the communication is established, the commands 
can be sent to the Robot controller through AML/Entry command prompt. 
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Connector C2: DI/ DO Interface 
The 54-pin connector on the controller with the label C2 is the connector for the Digital Input 
and Digital Output interface. Appendix 3 presents a list of the pins on the DI/ DO C2 
connector and their function. These pins are used to perform regular DI/ DO operations as 
well as pre-defined functions.  
 
Digital Inputs: 
There are 16 general purpose digital inputs and 5 control inputs. Six out of 16 general 
purpose inputs are also used as command digital inputs. A “1” at digital input indicates a 
connection to DI ground and a “0” at digital input indicates no connection to DI ground. 
 
The following Control Inputs are used in this application: 
a. Inhibit Move to Home: This point pin W, when connected to DI ground, inhibits 
movement to the home position. 
b. Emergency Stop: This point pin X must be connected to DI ground before 
manipulator power can be turned on. 
c. Manipulator Power: Manipulator power is powered up by connecting the two inputs 
pin Y and pin Z; once the manipulator is powered up, these pins can be terminated. 
 
The DI points from 12 to 16 are multifunction inputs. These inputs are used to send 5-bit 
command code and a strobe bit to the controller. The command codes can be recognized by 
the Robot controller only on the rising edge at the strobe input. Appendix 4 presents a list of 
5-bit command codes and applicable function. 
   47
 
The list below presents the six command codes that are used in the current system:  
• Auto Mode: This command code causes the system to enter into the Auto Mode. 
When the Auto Mode is activated, the Manual Mode DO point is turned off. 
• Reset Error: This command code resets an error condition. When the error has been 
corrected and the error condition is reset, the Error DO is turned off. 
• Return Home: This command code causes the manipulator to return to the home 
position. When this position is reached, the At home DO point is turned on. 
• Select Application 1: This command code selects the application program 
downloaded in partition 1. 
• Start Cycle: This command code starts the application cycle when the system is in 
Auto Mode with an application selected. Once the cycle starts, the cycle running DO 
is turned on. 
• Command Strobe: When pin a is connected to DI ground, a strobe is sent to the 
controller. The command code is sent by OFF to ON transition of this DI point. The 
proper command code is issued before issuing the Command Strobe rising pulse. 
 
Digital Outputs: 
There are ten general purpose digital outputs, four status outputs and six command status 
outputs. When the DO point is “1,” it closes the connection to the load and when the DO 
point is “0,” it opens the connection to the load. 
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The following Status Outputs are used in this application: 
• Cycle Running: This point pin e is on when in Auto Mode, and an application has 
been selected and started. 
• Error: This point pin f is on during an error condition. This error is generated by the 
controller due to the internal fault conditions such as communication error, data error 
and overrun condition. 
• At Home: This point pin g is on when the manipulator is at the HOME position. 
• Unable to Move Home: This point pin h is on when the Return Home function is 
activated and the Inhibit Move to Home DI pin W is connected to DI ground. 
 
The DO points from 11 to 16 are multifunction outputs. These points are also used for 
following command status signals: 
• Manipulator Power On: This point indicates that the manipulator power is on. 
• Online: This point indicates that the remote communications are enabled. When 
online, the system responds to all commands sent over the communication line as 
well as the commands sent over the Remote Operator Control Panel. 
• Manual Mode: This point indicates that system is in manual mode. Manual mode can 
only be entered by pressing the Manual mode button on the operator control panel. 
• Cycle Stopping: This point indicates that an application program is in the process of 
stopping, after the STOP Cycle command is sent. Once the cycle has stopped, the DO 
is turned off. 
• Overtime: This point indicates an overtime condition and remains on until the Error 
Rest function is invoked. 
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• Op Panel Disabled: This point indicates that the operator control panel is disabled. 
 
Connector C3: Operator Control Panel Interface 
The 54-pin connector with the label C3 is used as an interface between the Robot controller 
and the Operator Control Panel. 
 
C. Operator Control Panel 
 
The control panel provides a way to control the manipulator by issuing commands through 
pressure-sensitive keys. It also provides a means of monitoring the operation of the system 
by observing which LEDs are lit. The operator control panel can be used to control the 
movement of the Robot, when the C2 connector (DI/ DO interface) is not connected to any 
peripheral device such as PLC. This panel can also be used to teach multiple points within 
the work envelope that are necessary for Robot programs.  
 
4.2.2 PLC Architecture 
The PLC based control system is designed for controlling Robot 1, Robot 2, Robot 3 and a 
Conveyor. The PLC based control system is implemented in distributed control architecture. 
The CPU PLC-5/40E has a remote I/O scanner port and an Ethernet port. Four remote I/O 
modules are connected to the CPU over the Remote I/O bus. This architecture provides the 
flexibility of connecting I/O modules near each Robot station and on the conveyor. The 
distributed system reduces the wiring complexity to a greater extent. Figure 4.2 shows the 
distributed PLC based control architecture for a “Before Case.” 
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Each I/O module (Rack) is dedicated to a specific functional area. For example Rack 2 is 
dedicated to Robot 1, Rack 4 is dedicated to Robot 2, Rack 6 is dedicated for proximity 
sensors on conveyor and photo beam sensors on pen feeder station and Rack 3 is dedicated to 
all the pneumatic controls (clamps and stoppers) on the conveyor.  
 
The PLC-5/40E rack includes CPU, Co-processor module, Power supply and DH+/DH-485 
adapter. The CPU has a Remote I/O scanner port at Ch 1 B. All the I/O racks are connected 
over the Remote I/O bus in multidrop network. It has a three-wire connection connected to 
each I/O module at Blue, Clear and Shield terminals. The baudrate for this remote I/O bus is 
set to 57.6 KBaud. Each I/O module is configured with a unique address. The CPU also has 
an Ethernet port which is configured for IP address: 129.21.92.67. The CPU acquires the I/O 
signal status over the Remote I/O bus and supplies this information over the 100 Mbps 
Ethernet network. The HMI application is designed with RS View 32 and is also connected 
over the same Ethernet network. The PLC- 5/40E and HMI communicate over Ethernet 
network. 
 
Appendix 5 presents the PLC I/O list that shows the interconnection between the robots, 
Sensors, actuators and PLC I/O modules. Appendix 6 shows the wiring schematic for the 
connection between Robot I/Os and PLC I/Os. 
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Figure 4.2: The distributed PLC based control architecture for “Before Case” system. 
 
4.2.3 Sensors and Actuators 
The system has six proximity sensors, four photobeam sensors, eight pneumatic actuators and 
a 120VAC Motor. Appendix 7 presents the list of the sensors and actuators and their 
location. Appendix 8 presents the wiring schematic of the motor control operation. The Start 
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and Stop pushbuttons are used to control the motor operation. There is no hardwired ESTOP 
function implemented in this system for Robot 1, Robot 2 and a conveyor.  
 
4.3 Programming 
4.3.1 Robot Programming 
A Manufacturing Language/ Entry (AML/ Entry) version 4.1 is used for Robot programming. 
The command set is listed in the IBM 7545 series AML programming guide. AML/ Entry 
application software (.exe) is run from a DOS command prompt. This application software is 
used: 
• To establish the communication between a personal computer and a Robot. 
• To write and edit the program. 
• To compile the program. 
• To load/ unload the program to/ from a Robot. 
 
Each Robot has a specific program. Robot 1 is programmed to pick up a paper substrate and 
place it on the pallet present at station 1. Robot 2 is programmed to pick up a selected pen 
and write three characters on the paper substrate. 
 
Appendices 9 and 10 explain the logic for both Robot programs in flow-chart format and 
appendices 11 and 12 present the actual programs. 
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4.3.2  PLC Programming 
The RSLogix 5 software is used for PLC programming. All the programs are developed in 
Ladder programming language. The entire program is divided into main program and 
subroutines. 
The main program is developed to perform the following functions: 
• Call the Robot 1 startup subroutine. 
• Call the Robot 2 startup subroutine. 
• Control the conveyor operation. 
• Read the status of proximity sensors on the conveyor. 
• Control the pneumatic stoppers and clamps. 
• Call the Pen Check subroutine. 
• Call the Check Data subroutine.  
• Call the Send Char subroutine. 
• Execute the data reset function in case of emergency stop of the Robot 2. 
Appendices 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 present the associated flow charts and functional 
details for the main program and subroutines.  
 
4.3.3 HMI Programming: 
The RSView 32 application software is used to develop the Human Machine Interface. Table 
4.1 explains the list of screens and their functions. 
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No. HMI Display Screen Functions 
1 Main Screen 
 
• Start the project 
• Navigate to the Station 1 screen 
• Navigate to the Station 2 screen 
• End the project 
2 Station 1 
 
• Switch Robot 1 Manipulator Power ON 
• Control the ESTOP for Robot 1 
• Displays the current status of the Station 1 
• Navigate to the Robot 1 status screen 
• Navigate to the Main screen 
3 Station 2 
 
• Switch Robot 2 Manipulator Power ON 
• Switch on the Conveyor 
• Control the ESTOP for Robot 2 
• Navigate to the Robot 2 status screen 
• Displays the current status of the Station 2 
• Navigate to the Data Entry screen 
• Navigate to the Main screen 
4 Station 1 Status 
 
• Display the current status of the Robot 1 
• Navigate to the Station 1 screen 
5 Station 2 Status 
 
• Display the current status of the Robot 2 
• Navigate to the Station 2 screen 
6 Data Entry 
 
• Enter character to print data 
• Select the pen 
• Display available pen color 
• Click “Print” to send the information to the PLC 
• Navigate to the Station 2 screen 
 
Table 4.1: List of HMI display screens and associated functions. 
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   56
5. Test Cases, Risk Assessment and 
Selection of Safety Control System 
Architecture 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The “Before Case” Robotic manufacturing cell is controlled by a non-safety PLC-based 
control system. This system is operated in three modes: 
1. Normal Operation. 
2. Teaching. 
3. Maintenance. 
 
Normal Operation: 
The scope of Normal Operation of the system includes fully automated operation of the 
robots and the conveyor using the PLC based control system. It does not include the 
controlling of robots by using operator control panel and/ or operating the PLC in 
programming mode. 
 
Teaching: 
The scope of the Teaching mode includes operation of the robots using the Robot command 
prompts or by using operator control panel.  
 
   57
 
 
Maintenance: 
The scope of the Maintenance mode includes testing of the PLC I/Os, Robot I/Os, PLC 
programs, Robot programs and HMI programs. It also includes testing or repairs of the 
hardware connection and component wiring. 
 
The system response in case of fault event is analyzed for all operation modes. 
 
5.2 Selection of Test Cases 
There are many fault events possible with each mode of operation. The current control 
system does not have the capability to detect these fault events. These fault events may result 
in a minor or severe injury to personal and damage to the product or the system. Although the 
current system is smaller in scope compared to industrial applications, this system can be 
used to model real-life scenario. Each component of the system can be analyzed for different 
failure modes to identify all possible fault events. In a real-life scenario, a team of experts 
works together to analyze and find out all the possible functional safety needs of the system. 
The performance of each component can be analyzed for safety under different test 
conditions, such as various combinations of functions and operating modes.  
 
It is not feasible to cover all possible fault events under the scope of this thesis due to the 
limited time and resources. For this reason, four events are selected to represent the 
functional safety needs of the current system. These test cases are selected such that each of 
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the four cases covers a fault event associated with each operating component connected in 
the system. In this thesis, fault conditions related to the automation system failure such as 
intrusion into the hazardous area, hardware failure and hardwired connection errors are 
considered. Mechanical system faults and software/programming errors are not considered in 
this study. Case 1 represents the hazardous condition associated with Robot 1 and its 
operation. Case 2A represents the hazardous condition associated with Robot 2 operation and 
the operator’s access to its work envelope. Case 2B represents the hazardous condition due to 
the hardware failure of a component such as wire break or a relay failure, which can happen 
in Robot 1 or Robot 2. Case 3 represents the hazardous condition due to high voltage 
electrical connections and the conveyor rotation. To avoid real-life injuries, the response of 
the system was observed by forcing each fault condition using inanimate objects. These cases 
are used to demonstrate the calculation the safety requirements in terms of Safety Integrity 
Levels (SIL), design and implementation the safety control system and validation the safety 
system performance with respect to the identified safety needs. Table 5.1 shows the test cases 
selected for safety system implementation. 
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No. Fault 
Condition 
Mode of 
Operation 
Response of the existing system Expected response of the safety system 
1 
Operator enters 
the Robotic 
work cell near 
the Robot 
1work envelope 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Waits for error clear signal 
• Restarts the operation from Home 
Teaching 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Generates the alarm 
Maintenance 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Stops the Robot 1 
• Waits for error clear signal to restart 
2A 
Operator 
intrusion in the 
station 2 pallet 
area 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the intrusion 
• Stops the Robot 2 
• Waits for error clear signal 
• Restarts the operation from Home 
Teaching 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the intrusion 
• Generates the alarm 
Maintenance 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
• Detects the intrusion 
• Generates the alarm 
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acknowledgment or reset • Possible to disable it temporarily 
2B 
Robot 2 
ESTOP relay 
failure 
Normal 
Operation 
• Robot 2 is still in operation 
unexpectedly 
• Failure is not detected 
• Diagnostics not available 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment 
• Detects the failure of the signal through wire break circuit test 
• Voting logic can be implemented to improve the reliability of 
the signal 
• Diagnostic information is used to troubleshoot the fault 
Maintenance 
• Robot 2 does not start 
• Diagnostics not available 
• Difficult to troubleshoot this 
fault 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment 
• Diagnostic information is available to troubleshoot the fault 
3 
Operator 
reaches near the 
rotating motor 
and running 
conveyor 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator through door gate 
• Access control such as gate switch protects the operator 
• Stops the motor and conveyor 
Maintenance 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator through door gate 
• Access control such as gate switch protects the operator 
• Stops the motor and conveyor 
 
Table 5.1: Selected test cases for safety implementation. 
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5.3 Risk Assessment 
5.3.1 Introduction 
According to the IEC 61508 part 5[28], risk assessment techniques determine the tolerable risk 
for a specific situation that has to be achieved by necessary risk reduction. The safety-related 
systems are designed to reduce the probability of occurrence of the hazardous event and/ or 
the consequences of the hazardous event. The tolerable risk depends on many factors such as 
severity of injury, the number of people exposed to danger, the frequency at which a person 
or people are exposed to danger and the duration of the exposure. The inputs required to 
estimate the tolerable risk are: 
• Guidelines from the appropriate safety regulatory authority. 
• Discussions and agreements with the different parties involved in the application. 
• Industry standards and guidelines. 
• The best independent industrial, expert and scientific advice from advisory bodies. 
• Legal requirements, both general and those directly relevant to the specific 
application. 
 
As discussed earlier, there are two methods for risk assessment, quantitative method and 
qualitative method.  
 
The quantitative method can be applied when: 
• The tolerable risk is to be specified in a numerical manner. 
• Hardware failure data is provided by the component manufacturers. 
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• Numerical targets have been specified for the safety integrity levels for the safety-
related systems. 
 
In this research, the hardware failure data is not available from the manufacturers and the 
numerical targets are also not specified for the system. Hence, the qualitative methods such 
as Risk-Graph and function-based FMEA are used to calculate the safety integrity level 
requirement for each test case. 
 
5.3.2 Risk Assessment by using Qualitative Methods 
 
A. Risk-Graph Analysis 
IEC 61508- part 5 Annex D[30] describes a Risk-Graph analysis method and its application. 
According to this method, the risk is calculated using a formula 5.1; 
R= f  * C -----------------------------------------------------(5.1) 
Where, R is the risk with no safety-related system is in place, f is the frequency of hazardous 
event with no safety-related system in place and C is the extent of damage. The frequency of 
hazardous event depends on three factors, which include the duration of stay of a person in 
the dangerous area (A), aversion of danger (G) and probability of occurrence (W). Figure 2.5 
presents various levels of these factors and figure 2.6 explains how to determine SIL levels 
based on the levels of these factors. Based on these figures, Risk-Graph method is applied to 
each test case to determine the SIL requirement.  
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A fault condition, operator enters the Robotic work cell near the Robot 1 work envelope, is 
analyzed for test case 1. Table 5.2 shows the Risk-Graph analysis and SIL calculation for test 
case 1. 
Variables Value Level 
Extent of damage, C Cb Severe injury or death of a person 
Duration of stay of a person in the 
dangerous area, A 
Ab Frequent to permanent 
Aversion of danger, G Gb Hardly possible 
Probability of occurrence, W W3 Relatively high 
SIL level required SIL 3  
 
Table 5.2: Risk-Graph analysis for test case 1. 
 
Based on the above data, the SIL 3 certified safety-related system is required to avoid any 
hazardous event related to this fault condition. 
 
A fault condition, operator intrusion in the station 2 pallet area, is analyzed for test case 2A. 
Table 5.3 shows the Risk-Graph analysis and SIL calculation for test case 2A. 
Variables Value Level 
Extent of damage, C Cb Severe injury or death of a person 
Duration of stay of a person in the 
dangerous area, A 
Ab Frequent to permanent 
Aversion of danger, G Gb Hardly possible 
Probability of occurrence, W W3 Relatively high 
SIL level required SIL 3  
 
Table 5.3: Risk-Graph analysis for test case 2A. 
 
Based on the above data, the SIL 3 certified safety-related system is required to avoid any 
hazardous event related to this fault condition. 
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A fault condition, Robot 2 ESTOP relay failure, is analyzed for test case 2B. Table 5.4 shows 
the Risk-Graph analysis and SIL calculation for test case 2B. 
Variables Value Level 
Extent of damage, C Cb Severe injury or death of a person 
Duration of stay of a person in 
the dangerous area, A 
Ab Frequent to permanent 
Aversion of danger, G Gb Hardly possible 
Probability of occurrence, W W2 Low 
SIL level required SIL 2  
 
Table 5.4: Risk-Graph analysis for test case 2B. 
 
Based on the above data, the SIL 2 certified safety-related system is required to avoid any 
hazardous event related to this fault condition. 
 
A fault condition, operator reaches near the rotating motor and running conveyor, is analyzed 
for test case 3. Table 5.5 shows the Risk-Graph analysis and SIL calculation for test case 3. 
Variables Value Level 
Extent of damage, C Cb Severe injury or death of a person 
Duration of stay of a person in 
the dangerous area, A 
Ab Frequent to permanent 
Aversion of danger, G Gb Hardly possible 
Probability of occurrence, W W3 Relatively high 
SIL level required SIL 3  
 
Table 5.5: Risk-Graph analysis for test case 3. 
 
Based on the above data, the SIL 3 certified safety-related system is required to avoid any 
hazardous event related to this fault condition.  
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Based on the Risk-Graph Analysis, it can be seen that three of the four test cases need SIL-3 
safety-related system to operate in safe condition.  
 
B. Function-based FMEA 
Another qualitative risk assessment method called Function-based FMEA is used to calculate 
the Probability of occurrence, Severity and possibility of detecting the failure in each test 
case. This method is used to verify the safety-level requirement generated by a Risk-Graph 
analysis. The function-based FMEA analysis includes:  
 
A. Function/ Requirement: The intended operation designed for the system. Any 
deviation from the intended function results in a functional failure. 
B. Potential Failure Modes: It describes the deviation from the intended function. 
C. Potential Causes of Failures: These are the reasons or root causes for deviations. 
D. Occurrence: Probability at which this failure occurs. 
E. Local Effects: These are the immediate effects of the failures within the product or 
the system being analyzed and may not be recognized by the user. 
F. End Effects: These are the noticeable effects on product, the system and a user. 
G. Severity: It describes the seriousness of the potential end effect. 
H. Detection Method/Current Controls: It describes the possibility of detecting the 
failure before it creates the local effects. 
 
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a product of Probability of Occurrence (O), severity of 
the failure (S) and the detectability of the failure (D). The RPN value provides an estimated 
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level of intensity of the hazardous condition associated with the failure. Higher the RPN 
value associated with the failure, higher priority is placed to reduce the risk associated with 
the cause of failure. As the priority level of risk increases, the safety requirement increases to 
reduce the risk associated with the cause of failure. The level of safety requirements can be 
linked to the RPN values as follows: 
• RPN > 900 requires highest level of safety. 
• 900 >= RPN > 700 requires high level of safety. 
• 700 >= RPN > 400 requires moderate level of safety. 
• 400 >= RPN >= 100 requires low level of safety. 
• RPN < 100 requires very low level of safety, no special safety is required. 
 
The function-based FMEA analysis for each test case with “Before Case” system is shown in 
Table 5.9. The index ratings for probability of occurrence, severity and detection for each test 
case are calculated based on the article on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis by S. Kmenta 
and K. Ishii[31]. Table 5.6 presents the index ratings of probability of occurrence, Table 5.7 
presents the index ratings of severity and Table 5.8 presents the index ratings of likelihood 
detection used for the FMEA analysis.  
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Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Occurrence 
Ranking 
Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >= 1 in 2 10 
1 in 3 9 
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8 
1 in 20 7 
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6 
1 in 400 5 
1 in 2000 4 
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15000 3 
1 in 150000 2 
Remote: Failure is unlikely 1 in 1500000 1 
 
Table 5.6: Index ratings of the probability of occurrence[31]. 
 
      
Effect Severity of Effect Severity 
Ranking 
Hazardous without warning When a failure mode affects safe device operation 
without warning 
10 
Hazardous with warning When a failure mode affects safe device operation 
with warning 
9 
Very high Device inoperable: loss of primary function 8 
High Device operable: at a highly reduced level of 
performance 
7 
Moderate Device operable: at a reduced level of 
performance 
6 
Low Device operable: at a slightly reduced level of 
performance 
5 
Very low Device operable: defect noticed by most 4 
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customers 
Minor Device operable: defect noticed by average 
customers 
3 
Very minor Device operable: defect noticed by discriminating 
customers 
2 
None Almost no effect 1 
 
Table 5.7: Index ratings of the severity of effect[31]. 
 
 
Likelihood of Detection Detection Ranking 
Almost impossible to detect 10 
Remote detection 9 
Very slight detection 8 
Slight detection 7 
Low detection 6 
Medium detection 5 
Moderate chance of detection 4 
High probability of detection 3 
Very high probability of detection 2 
Almost uncertain to detect 1 
 
Table 5.8: Index ratings of the likelihood of detection[31].
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Sr.
No. 
Function/R-
equirement 
Potential 
Failure 
Modes 
Potential 
Causes of 
Failure 
Occurrence 
(O) 
(1-10) 
Local 
Effects 
End Effects on Product, 
User, other systems 
Severity 
(S) 
(1-10) 
Detection 
Method/ 
Current 
Controls 
Detection 
(D) 
(1-10) 
RPN = 
(O x S x 
D) 
(1-1000) 
1 Robot 1 work 
envelope 
Operator hit 
by Robot 
arm 
Operator 
intrusion in 
Robot 1 work 
envelope 
10 
Hit by a 
Robot 1 
arm 
Generates Robot 1 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the substrate because of 
the air pressure release 
9 No Detection 10 900 
Operator 
trying to 
empty or 
change paper 
container 
10 
Hit by a 
Robot 1 
arm 
Generates Robot 1 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the substrate because of 
the air pressure release 
9 No Detection 10 900 
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2A 
Robot 2 
Work 
envelope 
Operator hit 
by Robot 
arm 
Operator 
intrusion in 
Robot 2 work 
envelope 
10 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
Generates Robot 2 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the pen because of the air 
pressure release 
9 No Detection 10 900 
Pinch point 
at station 2 
pallet area 
Operator 
trying to 
adjust a pallet 
or a substrate 
on a pallet 
10 
Pinch 
points 
due to 
Robot's 
moveme
nt in Z 
axis 
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 10 900 
Cut by end 
effector tool 
at station 2 
pallet area 
Operator 
trying to 
adjust the pen 
in the end 
effector  
10 Cut by the tool  
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 10 900 
Operator 
trying to 
chang or 
restock the 
pen in the pen 
feeder 
10 Cut by the tool  
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 10 900 
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2B 
Robot 2 
ESTOP 
operation 
Signal not 
recognized 
by Robot 
Relay failure 5 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 
LED 
indication 
on the 
relay 
9 405 
PLC output 
channel 
failure 
5 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 
LED 
indication 
on the 
PLC 
output 
module 
9 405 
Wire break 6 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 No Detection 10 540 
3 
Move the 
pallet on the 
conveyor 
Operator 
hurt by the 
rotating 
parts of the 
motor 
Open moving 
parts of the 
rotor 
10 Pinch points 
Severe injury to the 
operator, motor maynot 
rotate 
8 No Detection 10 800 
Open gearbox 10 Multiple 
cuts 
Severe injury to the 
operator 4 
No 
Detection 10 400 
Entanglement 
of a cloth in 
moving 
conveyor 
6 Entangle
ment  
Severe injury to the 
operator, conveyor may 
not move 
8 No Detection 10 480 
Electrical 
shock due to 
live AC 
wiring 
8 
Severe 
electric 
shock to 
the 
operator 
Severe injury to the 
operator 9 
No 
Detection 10 720 
      
Table 5.9: Function-based FMEA for “Before Case” System. 
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Figure 5.1: Pareto-Chart for “Before Case” FMEA Analysis.
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5.3.3 Qualitative Analysis Results Evaluation 
Based on the FMEA results, it can be stated that the Robot 1 and Robot 2 work envelope 
functions require the highest level of safety. The motor and conveyor system requires 
moderate-to-high level of safety, and Robot 2 ESTOP function needs moderate level of 
safety. When each functional failure is divided into multiple causes of failures, the safety 
level requirement varies depending on the probability of occurrence, severity and detection 
capabilities. A Pareto-Chart analysis is performed to obtain a clear picture on the safety level 
requirements for every potential cause of failure. The Pareto-Chart as shown in figure 5.1 
shows the relationship between the Risk Priority Number and a cause of failure. Based on the 
Pareto-Chart, it can be stated that no safety-related controls are available in the current 
system to perform safety functions. A Pareto-Chart shows that 59% of total causes generate 
high level of hazardous condition with 900 RPN. The causes of failure included in this 59% 
are mainly related to Robot 1 and Robot 2 operations. Thus, to reduce the possible hazardous 
event, a safety-related system with high-level of safety is required for Robot 1 and Robot 2 
operations. This verifies the calculated SIL 3 levels for test case 1 and test case 2A by using 
Risk-Graph method.  
 
The next highest RPN is calculated for motor-related failures such as open moving parts of 
the motor and electrical shock due to the AC wiring. Due to highest probability of occurrence 
and no possible detection, high-level of safety is required to avoid the hazardous event in 
these cases. This verifies the calculated SIL 3 level for test case 3 by using Risk-Graph 
analysis. The RPN varies from 400 to 600 for remaining causes of failures. These causes 
require moderate level of safety. This verifies the calculated SIL 2 level for test case 2B. 
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Some of these causes are related to Robot 1, Robot 2 and Motor operation. Thus, safety 
requirements for these causes need to be raised to SIL 3 so that the SIL 3 safety requirement 
of Robot 1, Robot 2 and Motor can be satisfied.  
 
5.4 Selection of Safety Control System Architecture 
Since the safety control systems are becoming more prominent requirements in 
process/machine environment, many ready-to-use and customizable solutions are available. 
This allows the user to design precise safety control implementations, suitable for a specific 
application. The design of the safety control system architecture varies from simple to high 
level of complexity depending on the scope of the application and the SIL requirement. It is 
very difficult for an automation engineer to study all associated factors and select the most 
appropriate control system architecture which meets the requirements. Therefore, the design 
of the safety control system varies based on various criteria such as what kind of 
architectures are available, what application suits those architectures, what costs are involved 
and what level of safety can be achieved as per the applicable standards. A white paper 
published by Rockwell Automation[32] describes various factors that are considered for 
selecting the suitable safety control architecture.  
 
5.4.1 Types of System Architectures  
There are four types of system architectures available for designing a safety control system. 
These architectures include: 
   75
1. Component-based system: This is the most basic and a cost-effective way to perform 
low-risk safety function. For example, an E-STOP push button can be provided to cut the 
power to the circuit when pressed.  
 
2. Dedicated safety relay system: A relay provides single safety function dedicated to a 
specific operation. It is mainly used to switch off the power to the output device when the 
safety input senses the fault condition. It provides basic diagnostic features such as LED 
indicator on the relay with input and output status. These relays are non-programmable 
and don’t support high-level network communication interface. Although it is a simple 
and cost-effective solution, it can not be used for control applications which involve 
multiple safety functions and high level of diagnostic requirements. 
 
3. Modular relay: This system is an expandable version of the dedicated relay. It can 
perform single safety function. A safety input removes the power to all output devices 
connected to this relay. It can handle up to 20 dual-channel inputs and 10 dual-channel 
outputs. It provides module-based diagnostics with network communication interface. It 
can not be used for multiple safety functions and for systems where safety is controlled in 
zones. 
 
4. Safety PLC: The safety PLC can be used when there is a need for multiple safety 
functions and large number of input and output devices up to several hundreds I/Os. This 
is also the only solution if analog signals are involved in the system. This can be a cost-
effective solution for centralized and/ or distributed architectures. The inherent 
   76
programmability and detailed diagnostics makes it an ideal choice for complex, high-risk 
applications.  
 
Theoretically, a non-safety PLC with external relay circuits can be used to perform critical 
functions. However, such control circuits can not be certified for SIL levels and thus cannot 
be accepted by any safety monitoring organization. 
 
5.4.2 Selecting a suitable system for a specific application 
A thorough evaluation is necessary to understand the size and the complexity of the system 
before designing the safety architecture. Some safety systems may or may not address the 
safety requirements determined by the application. Hence, it is the automation engineer’s 
responsibility to perform checks on the functionality requirements. For example, an ESTOP 
function to stop the motor can be performed by using a safety relay. When the number of 
I/Os increases, an additional modular relay can be added easily without oversizing the 
system. However, for performing functions such as timed out, muting controls and zone 
controls, expandable relays can not be used. In such applications, dedicated relay or safety 
PLC can be used. Sequential shutdown application, which requires stopping of the machine 
in several steps, can be performed by using safety relay or safety PLC. However, if the 
system needs to be shut down in multiple steps or the system control needs to be transferred 
from one control system to another, safety relay does not serve the purpose. In such 
applications, safety PLC will be the most feasible solution. The partial shutdown and zone 
control are few more examples where safety PLC is the only solution which can be 
implemented. Safety PLC is an ideal choice for process industries where hundreds of analog 
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signals are involved. This requirement can not be addressed by any other safety controls 
architecture but the safety PLC. If the system needs distributed controls and monitoring, 
safety PLC offers safety network interfaces to exchange data over a high-speed 
communication media. The signal status of the input and output devices with their diagnostic 
information can be made available to the controller from different locations of the plant. 
Dedicated safety relays provide diagnostic information in terms of the LED indicator on the 
module. The diagnostics information such as wire break and discrepancy error, can be 
generated only in safety PLC. 
 
5.4.3 Cost factor 
The cost factor is an important aspect which drives the decision of the safety control system. 
The goal is to get the highest level of safety achievable within the project cost. In some 
situations, a low investment on safety systems may cause irrecoverable loss of production, 
human or property damage. The scalability, the number of I/O signals, signal/equipment 
locations, functional requirements and affordable downtime are few criteria influence the 
cost of the system. 
 
5.4.4 SIL requirement standards 
A demand on the safety-related system is different for each application. Thus, two different 
modes of operation are defined for safety-related system in IEC 61508 standard. These are 
called low-demand mode and high-demand mode.  
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A low-demand mode is applicable to the process industry. In this mode the failure rates are 
defined in years. A process safety is applicable to the continuous processes such as power 
generation, boiler control, burner management systems and chemical plants where 
continuous operations are required. However, these processes are designed and controlled to 
stay within a normal operating envelope, and hence the demand on a safety system is low. 
The demand on the safety system only occurs when a specific process parameter goes outside 
the normal operating range. When that demand occurs, the safety system is designed to move 
the process to a safe state. When there is a fault in the system, it is designed to isolate the 
fault and keep the process running usually using redundancy. The safety system is designed 
also to move the process to a safe state because it can no longer monitor the specific hazard 
scenario reliably. The primary objective in this mode is to keep the system running 
continuously within a tolerable risk. The SIL levels and associated PFD ranges are shown in 
figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: SIL ratings for low-demand operational mode[21]
. 
 
A high-demand mode is applicable to the production industry. In this mode the failure rates 
are defined in hours. A machine safety is applicable to the manufacturing system where CNC 
machines and robots are involved. These systems are protected by safeguards such as 
physical guarding, light curtains and pressure mats feeding into electrical interlocks. These 
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systems also involve very frequent human intervention. These types of applications have the 
potential for a frequent demand on the safety system. Therefore, high-demand or continuous-
demand mode is used for such applications. Safeguards such as physical barriers are used to 
ensure that the operator keeps a safe distance. However, the safeguards do not necessarily 
protect against a fault in the machine. The primary objective is to protect the operator, the 
machine and the product. If an operator approaches a protected machine, the safeguards 
either physically prevent proximity or shutdown the machine. The SIL levels and associated 
PFD ranges are as shown in figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: SIL ratings for high-demand operational mode[21]
. 
 
5.4.5 Architecture selection for “After Case” 
The safety control system selection can be based on all of the above parameters. It can be 
single or a combination of multiple solutions. It is not necessary to use single architecture for 
the entire application. Multiple systems based on different architectures can be used and 
integrated together to meet the safety requirements of the application. The technological 
advancement in open networking protocols has made it easier to integrate various third-party 
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safety and non-safety control architectures together. This approach is used mainly to control 
the cost of the project. 
 
IEC 61508 standard also recommends separating safety system from process control system. 
The reason to separate these systems is to keep the operation of safety function isolated from 
non-safety functions. The purpose is to ensure that a failure of any non-safety function will 
not jeopardize the operation of safety function of the system. The automation engineer can 
make use of this clause for building two different systems, one for safety (high cost) and 
another for normal process operation (low cost). This ensures that the control system is 
designed for required SIL within the given project cost. 
 
The manufacturing system used for this work consists of two robots and a conveyor 
controlled by a PLC-based control system. Hence, it is considered to be an example of 
machine safety so the high-demand mode or continuous-demand mode is placed on the 
safety-related system.  
  
Based on above discussion, the following factors are considered in selecting the safety PLC 
based control architecture: 
• The overall calculated SIL (SIL-3).  
• The safety-related system needs to perform multiple safety-related functions 
simultaneously.  
• Distributed control architecture required to provide connectivity with the safety 
sensors that are physically distributed across the Robotic cell.  
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• Requirement for independent control systems to control the cost of the project.  
 
A non-safety system is used to control the robots and conveyor and to perform normal 
operations. The safety system is used to perform safety-related functions only. In this case, 
the safety system has a priority in operation. Non-safety functions cannot be performed if the 
safety functional requirements are not satisfied. The primary objective of this safety system is 
to shutdown the faulty system whenever faults are detected.  
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Chapter 6 
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6. Description of the “After Case” 
System 
 
6.1 Introduction  
A Siemens safety PLC system was used to implement the SIL-3 safety-related system in the 
robotic manufacturing cell. Based on conclusions derived in Chapter 5, a safety PLC with 
distributed control architecture was designed to cover all four test cases.  
 
This safety system was implemented separately with the existing non-safety PLC control 
system. This safety system is designed to control the Robot 1 ESTOP (digital input), Robot 2 
ESTOP (digital input) and power to the motor. The manipulator power for Robot 1 and 
Robot 2 can be turned on using RSView 32 HMI only if the fault conditions are not present 
and/or ESTOP 12 or ESTOP 3 or ESTOP ALL pushbuttons are not activated. Similarly, the 
conveyor can be turned on only if the fault conditions related to test case 3 are not present 
and/or ESTOP 12 or ESTOP 3 or ESTOP ALL push buttons are not activated. Appendices 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 show the display screens developed using RSView 32 HMI for the 
“After case” system. 
 
For designing SIL-3 safety-related system, all components used from sensor to actuator have 
to be certified for SIL-3. Figure 6.1 shows various components required to implement SIL-3 
control circuit and necessary SIL levels to achieve SIL-3 for the entire circuit.  
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Figure 6.1: SIL-3 safety-related system components and safety integrity levels. 
 
 
The implemented safety system is divided into three panels. Panel 1 consists of the safety 
CPU rack with safety I/O modules, Panel 2 consists of distributed safety rack with safety and 
general purpose I/O modules and Panel 3 is used as the operator panel to send START, 
STOP and Acknowledge (ACK) commands. The controls mounted on an operator panel 
provide functionality to start and stop all three operational components (Robot 1, Robot 2 
and the motor). In the beginning, it is required to press ACK button before pressing the 
START button. The ACK button is provided to acknowledge the fault condition. Until the 
fault is acknowledged after clearing the fault condition, the stopped system can not be turned 
on. The non-safety PLC program is modified to remove the “software ESTOP” function. 
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This program now checks for the safety signals provided by the safety PLC before starting 
the normal operations. Three hardwired ESTOP functions are provided in this system. 
Appendix 25 shows the list of Siemens Safety I/O modules and Siemens safety sensors used 
to implement safety-related system for all four cases. Appendix 26 presents the I/O list for 
safety PLC and associated sensors connections. Appendix 27 shows the modified I/O list 
after implementation of the “After Case” system. 
 
As shown in figure 6.1, SIL-3 safety circuits are designed by using safety-certified 
components. The components used are configured for safety as follows: 
1. Safety Sensors: 
• All the sensors used are certified for SIL-3 configuration. 
• Dual signals are generated by these sensors. 
• These sensors are powered by using external power supply. 
 
2. Safety Input Modules: 
• All safety input modules are certified for SIL-3 configuration. 
• Unique module address is set for each safety input module. 
• 1oo2 voting logic is used for all the safety signals. 
• Discrepancy time error is monitored for all 1oo2 connections. 
• Behavior at discrepancy time is defined. 
• Channel level fault diagnostics are enabled. 
• Behavior after channel fault is defined. 
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3. Safety PLC: 
• Safety CPU is certified for SIL-3 configuration. 
• Safety operating mode is activated. 
• Safety-certified software programming blocks are used. 
• OB 35, the organization block for safety, is added. 
• Safety program call structure is used via FC1. 
• Fault reintegration logic is developed in FC2. 
 
4. Safety Output: 
• All safety output modules are certified for SIL-3 configuration. 
• Unique module address is set for each safety input module. 
• Feedback circuit is implemented through safety contactors. 
• Channel read-back time is defined. 
• Channel level wire-break fault diagnostics are enabled. 
• Behavior after channel fault is defined. 
 
A safety-related function is designed and implemented separately for each test case. Figure 
6.2 shows the implemented safety system for the robotic manufacturing cell.  
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Figure 6.2: Implemented safety system architecture for the “After Case” Robotic manufacturing cell.
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The safety control system implementation and its operation for each test case are discussed in 
the following sections: 
 
6.2 Description of the Safety-Related system for Test Case 1 
In test case 1, the fault condition “Operator enters the robotic work cell near the Robot 1 
work envelope” is detected when the door gate switch is unplugged. Based on this fault 
detection signal, Robot 1 operation is controlled. A dual channel door guard safety sensor is 
used to detect the operator presence in the Robot 1 work envelope. Whenever this fault 
condition occurs, Robot 1 is turned off. The Robot 1 operation is turned off by switching the 
Robot 1 ESTOP digital input to 0. This digital input is driven by NO contacts of two safety 
contactors (K11 and K12) connected in series. The NC contacts of these contactors (K11_NC 
& K12_NC) are monitored in the PLC system with a logical AND gate operation and used as 
a feedback signal in the software program. The absence of door gate fault signal supplies the 
power to these two safety contactors that are connected in series. The presence of door gate 
fault signal disconnects the power to these safety contactors. The power to the contactors is 
controlled under following conditions: 
• Door gate fault signal status. 
• Safety contactor feedback status signal. 
• Emergency stop signal activated via ESTOP 12 or ESTOP 3 or ESTOP ALL push 
buttons. 
 
When the fault conditions related to test case 1 are not present, R1_healthy signal is 
generated by the safety system. This signal is sent to the non-safety PLC system for HMI 
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display. Once this signal is detected as high, only then can Robot 1 manipulator power, be 
turned on. Appendix 28 presents the FB1 programming block which shows the SIL-certified 
programming blocks used to implement test case 1 safety functions.  
 
6.3 Description of the Safety-Related system for Test Case 2A 
In test case 2A, the fault condition “Operator intrusion in the station 2 pallet area” is detected 
when the operator breaks the light barrier. Based on this fault detection signal, the Robot 2 
operation is controlled. A dual channel light curtain safety sensor is used to detect the 
operator presence in the Station 2 pallet area. Whenever this fault condition occurs, the Robot 
2 is turned off. The Robot 2 operation is turned off by switching the Robot 2 ESTOP digital 
input to 0. This digital input is driven by NO contacts of two safety contactors (K21 and 
K22) connected in series. The NC contacts of these contactors (K21_NC & K22_NC) are 
monitored in the PLC system with a logical AND gate operation and used as a feedback 
signal in the software program.  The absence of the light curtain fault signal supplies the 
power to these two safety contactors that are connected in series. The presence of the door 
gate fault signal disconnects the power to these safety contactors. The power to the 
contactors is controlled under following conditions: 
• Light curtain fault signal status. 
• Safety contactor feedback status signal. 
• Emergency stop signal activated via ESTOP 12 or ESTOP 3 or ESTOP ALL push 
buttons. 
This case is implemented with MUTING operation mode. The light curtain can be muted 
whenever required by using four toggle switches. The toggle switches (M1, M2, M3 & M4) 
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are mounted on the new operator panel. In case the operator needs to load or unload pens in 
the pen feeder station, muting mode is activated so that even if the operator breaks the light 
barrier, the Robot 2 is still operational. The MUTING operation mode can be dangerous 
when the Robot 2 is in operation. Therefore, the muting lamp mounted on the new operator 
panel is turned on and remains on until the muting mode is activated. When this lamp is 
turned on, the pen feeder is getting restocked and hence, no data printing command is 
supplied to the Robot 2 from HMI. When the fault conditions related to test case 2A and 2B 
are not present, R2_healthy signal is generated by the safety system. This signal is sent to the 
non-safety PLC system for HMI display. Once this signal is detected as high, only then can 
Robot 2 manipulator power, be turned on. Appendix 28 presents the FB2 programming block 
which shows the SIL-certified programming blocks used to implement test case 2A safety 
functions.  
 
6.4 Description of Safety-Related system for Test Case 2B 
In test case 2B, the fault condition “Robot 2 ESTOP relay failure” is detected because of the 
wire-break diagnostics available in the safety output module. The safety-related system to 
perform this safety function is implemented with the test case 2A for Robot 2 and with the 
test case 1 for Robot 1. The NC contacts, K11_NC & K12_NC in case of Robot 1 and NC 
contacts, K21_NC & K22_NC in case of Robot 2 are connected to the digital input modules 
of safety PLC. These signals are read and monitored through SIL-certified programming 
block, F_Feedback. The Robot ESTOP relay circuit is replaced with the two safety 
contactors. The Robot ESTOP digital input is now read through NO contact instead of NC 
contacts. With this type of connection, the ESTOP relay failure condition is avoided. A wire-
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break diagnosis is provided through the safety digital output module. A fault signal is 
generated in case of wire-break. This fault signal generates a fault in safety CPU and stops 
the Robot operation. The wire-break diagnosis information is also available in the CPU. This 
information is displayed in S7 software project and is used for troubleshooting such faults 
easily. Appendix 28 presents the OB1 organization block which shows how the feedback 
signal is generated for Robot 1 and Robot 2. Appendices 28 and 29 show how the SIL-
certified feedback programming block is used with the feedback signal generated by OB1 for 
Robot 1 and Robot 2.  
 
6.5 Description of Safety-Related system for Test Case 3 
In test case 3, the fault condition “Operator reaches near the rotating motor and running 
conveyor is detected” when the operator opens the glass door enclosing the motor. Based on 
this fault-detection signal, the motor operation is controlled. A motor is enclosed by a door. 
A pair of safety magnetic door switches is mounted on the opening side of the door. The door 
has to be opened to access the motor and its gearbox. Whenever the door is opened, a fault 
signal is generated by these magnetic door switches. Whenever this fault condition occurs, 
the Motor is turned off. The motor is driven by NO contacts of two safety contactors (K31 
and K32) connected in series. The NC contacts of the same contactors (K31_NC & K32_NC) 
are monitored in the PLC system with a logical AND gate operation and used as a feedback 
signal in the software program. The closing of this door supplies the power to the motor. The 
opening of this door gate generates a fault signal and disconnects the power to the motor. The 
power to the contactors is controlled under following conditions: 
• Magnetic door switches (opening or closing of the door). 
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• Safety contactor feedback status signal. 
• Emergency stop signal activated via ESTOP 12 or ESTOP 3 or ESTOP ALL push 
buttons. 
When the fault conditions related to test case 3 are not present, Motor_healthy signal is 
generated by the safety system. This signal is sent to the non-safety PLC system for HMI 
display. Once this signal is detected as high, only then can motor be turned on. Appendix 28 
presents the FB3 programming block which shows the SIL-certified programming blocks 
used to implement test case 3 safety functions, and OB1 shows how the feedback signal is 
generated for the motor control. 
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7. Safety Validation, Conclusion and 
Recommendation for the Future 
Work 
7.1 Introduction 
Once the safety-related system was implemented in the Robotic manufacturing cell, it was 
necessary to evaluate its performance. This process is called “Safety Validation.” The four 
test cases identified in chapter 5 were analyzed by using Risk-Graph and FMEA analysis and 
compared with results presented in chapter 5. 
 
7.2 Comparative Analysis between “Before Case” and “After 
Case” Systems 
Table 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show a comparative analysis of the system response for each test 
case. The response of the “After Case” system is compared with the response of the “Before 
Case” system. The response of the “Before Case” system shows the observed behavior of the 
robotic manufacturing cell with no safety-related system in place. The response of the “After 
Case” system shows the observed behavior of the robotic manufacturing cell with SIL 3 
certified safety-related system. The “After Case” system responses were tested with an 
operator. From this comparison, it can be seen that the detection of fault signal plays an 
important role in minimizing the probability of occurrence and thus the possible hazardous 
event. 
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Table 7.1: Comparative Analysis of the “Before Case” and “After Case” System Responses in case of fault condition for test case 1. 
No. Fault 
Condition 
Mode of 
Operation 
Response of the “Before 
Case” system 
Expected response of the safety 
system 
Response of the “After Case” system 
1 
Operator 
enters the 
Robotic 
work cell 
near the 
Robot 
1work 
envelope 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for 
error acknowledgment 
or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator 
in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Stop the Robot 1 
• Waits for error clear signal 
• Restarts the operation from Home 
• Does not allow operator to enter 
directly into the Robot 1 work 
envelope 
• Operator has to open the door switch 
to enter the area 
• Opening of the door switch stops the 
Robot 1 operation 
• Acknowledgement is mandatory to 
clear the error and restart the Robot 1 
Teaching • Fault not detected 
• Does not check for 
error acknowledgment 
or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator 
in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Generates an alarm 
Same as above 
Maintenance • Fault not detected 
• Does not check for 
error acknowledgment 
or reset 
• Detects the presence of the operator 
in Robot 1 work envelope 
• Stops the Robot 1 
• Waits for error clear signal to restart 
Same as above 
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Table 7.2: Comparative Analysis of the “Before Case” and “After Case” System Responses in case of fault condition for test case 2A. 
No. Fault 
Condition 
Mode of 
Operation 
Response of the “Before 
Case” system 
Expected response of the safety 
system 
Response of the “After Case” system 
2A 
Operator 
intrusion in 
the station 
2 pallet 
area 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or 
reset 
• Detects the intrusion, stops 
the Robot 2 
• Waits for error clear signal 
• Restarts the operation from 
Home 
• Does not allow operator to enter directly 
into the Robot 2 work envelope 
• If operator breaks the light barrier, Robot 
2 is stopped 
• In case of intrusion,  acknowledgement is 
mandatory to clear the error and restart 
the Robot 2 
• Intrusion is only allowed during the 
controlled muting mode 
Teaching • Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or 
reset 
• Detects the intrusion 
• Generates the alarm 
Same as above 
Maintenance • Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or 
reset 
• Detects the intrusion 
• Generates the alarm 
• Possible to disable it 
temporarily 
Same as above 
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Table 7.3: Comparative Analysis of the “Before Case” and “After Case” System Responses in case of fault condition for test case 2B. 
No. Fault 
Condition 
Mode of 
Operation 
Response of the “Before 
Case” system 
Expected response of 
the safety system 
Response of the “After Case” system 
2B 
Robot 2 
ESTOP 
relay 
failure 
Normal 
Operation 
• Robot 2 is still in operation 
unexpectedly 
• Failure is not detected 
• Diagnostics not available 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the failure of 
the signal through 
wire-break circuit test 
• Voting logic can be 
implemented to 
improve the reliability 
of the signal 
• Diagnostic 
information is used to 
troubleshoot the fault 
• ESTOP Relay is removed to avoid the relay 
failure 
• Wire break is detected by safety PLC and 
Robot 2 is stopped 
• Fault is generated in safety PLC and this 
diagnostic information is used for 
troubleshooting 
• Two safety contactors are used to improve 
the reliability of the output signal and to read 
the output signal as a feedback 
• Acknowledgement is mandatory to clear the 
error and restart the Robot 2 
Maintenance • Robot 2 does not start 
• Diagnostics not available, 
difficult to troubleshoot this 
fault 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Diagnostic 
information is 
available to 
troubleshoot the fault 
Same as above 
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Table 7.4: Comparative Analysis of the “Before Case” and “After Case” System Responses in case of fault condition for test case 3. 
 
No. Fault 
Condition 
Mode of 
Operation 
Response of the “Before 
Case” system 
Expected response of 
the safety system 
Response of the “After Case” system 
3 
Operator 
reaches 
near the 
rotating 
motor and 
running 
conveyor 
Normal 
Operation 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence 
of the operator through 
door gate 
• Access control such as 
gate switch protects 
the operator 
• Stops the motor and 
conveyor 
• Does not allow direct access to the motor 
• Operator has to open the door gate to access 
the motor connections and its components 
• Opening of the door gate stops the motor 
operation 
• Acknowledgement is mandatory to clear the 
error and restart the motor 
Maintenance 
• Fault not detected 
• Does not check for error 
acknowledgment or reset 
• Detects the presence 
of the operator through 
door gate 
• Access control such as 
gate switch protects 
the operator 
• Stops the motor and 
conveyor 
Same as above 
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7.3 Qualitative Risk Assessment for “After Case” 
Once the responses are compared, risk assessment methods such as Risk-Graph Analysis and 
FMEA are applied to calculate the level of safety required for the “After Case” system. These 
risk assessments are required to ensure that all the necessary safety-related systems are 
implemented and no additional safety is required to operate the system in safe mode.  
 
7.3.1 Risk-Graph Analysis 
The Risk-Graph analysis is applied to the “After Case” system. Due to the 100% detection of 
the fault provided in the “After Case” system, the extent of damage (C) is reduced to the 
level that is less than the lowest level of extent of damage (Ca: Light injury of a person, small 
environmental damage). According to figure 2.6, no special safety is required when the C is 
less than Ca. This means that the safety requirement for the “After Case” is less than SIL-1, 
the lowest level of safety requirement that can be calculated by the Risk-Graph analysis. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that no additional safety is required for the robotic 
manufacturing cell to operate in a safe mode and the highest level of required safety is 
achieved in “After Case” system. To verify this conclusion, the FMEA is used.  
 
7.3.2 Function-based FMEA 
Table 7.5 shows the FMEA analysis performed for the “After Case” system. It can be 
observed that, due to the highest level of detection and decreased probability of occurrence, 
the RPN value with respect to each cause of failure is drastically reduced compared to the 
“Before Case” FMEA analysis. The Pareto-Chart for the “After Case” is shown in figure 7.1. 
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This chart shows that the RPN for all causes of failure is less than 100. Compared to the 
“Before Case,” this number is much lower. Based on this, it is verified that the highest level 
of required safety is achieved in the “After Case” system, and no additional safety 
implementation is required to operate the robotic manufacturing cell in safe mode.  
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Sr.
No. 
Function/R-
equirement 
Potential 
Failure 
Modes 
Potential 
Causes of 
Failure 
Occurrence 
(O) 
(1-10) 
Local 
Effects 
End Effects on Product, 
User, other systems 
Severity 
(S) 
(1-10) 
Detection 
Method/ 
Current 
Controls 
Detection 
(D) 
(1-10) 
RPN = 
(O x S x 
D) 
(1-1000) 
1 Robot 1 work 
envelope 
Operator hit 
by Robot 
arm 
Operator 
intrusion in 
Robot 1 work 
envelope 
3 
Hit by a 
Robot 1 
arm 
Generates Robot 1 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the substrate because of 
the air pressure release 
9 No Detection 1 27 
Operator 
trying to 
empty or 
change paper 
container 
3 
Hit by a 
Robot 1 
arm 
Generates Robot 1 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the substrate because of 
the air pressure release 
9 No Detection 1 27 
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2A 
Robot 2 
Work 
envelope 
Operator hit 
by Robot 
arm 
Operator 
intrusion in 
Robot 2 work 
envelope 
3 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
Generates Robot 2 error 
(moves out of work 
envelope, severe injury to 
the operator, 
unintentional dropping of 
the pen because of the air 
pressure release 
9 No Detection 1 27 
Pinch point 
at station 2 
pallet area 
Operator 
trying to 
adjust a pallet 
or a substrate 
on a pallet 
3 
Pinch 
points 
due to 
Robot's 
moveme
nt in Z 
axis 
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 1 27 
Cut by end 
effector tool 
at station 2 
pallet area 
Operator 
trying to 
adjust the pen 
in the end 
effector  
3 Cut by the tool  
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 1 27 
Operator 
trying to 
chang or 
restock the 
pen in the pen 
feeder 
3 Cut by the tool  
Generates Robot 2 data 
error, severe injury to the 
operator because of the 
forceful movement of the 
Robot's end effector 
9 No Detection 1 27 
 
   103
 
2B 
Robot 2 
ESTOP 
operation 
Signal not 
recognized 
by Robot 
Relay failure 1 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 
LED 
indication 
on the 
relay 
1 9 
PLC output 
channel 
failure 
1 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 
LED 
indication 
on the 
PLC 
output 
module 
1 9 
Wire break 6 
Hit by a 
Robot 2 
arm 
System running in unsafe 
state, severe injury to the 
operator 
9 No Detection 1 54 
3 
Move the 
pallet on the 
conveyor 
Operator 
hurt by the 
rotating 
parts of the 
motor 
Open moving 
parts of the 
rotor 
1 Pinch points 
Severe injury to the 
operator, motor may not 
rotate 
8 No Detection 1 8 
Open gearbox 1 Multiple 
cuts 
Severe injury to the 
operator 4 
No 
Detection 1 4 
Entanglement 
of a cloth in 
moving 
conveyor 
1 Entangle
ment  
Severe injury to the 
operator, conveyor may 
not move 
8 No Detection 1 8 
Electrical 
shock due to 
live AC 
wiring 
1 
Severe 
electric 
shock to 
the 
operator 
Severe injury to the 
operator 9 
No 
Detection 1 9 
 
Table 7.5: The FMEA analysis for the “After Case” system.
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Figure 7.1: Pareto-Chart for “After Case” FMEA Analysis.
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7.4 Conclusion 
The Robotic Manufacturing Cell was set up by using non-safety PLC based control system. 
This system is referred as “Before Case” system. In the literature search, many safety 
analysis methods are discussed but there is no example to demonstrate how the results of 
these analyses can be used for a PLC based control system. However, one of the authors 
suggested that the conventional methods of safety analysis can be used for a PLC based 
control system. To test this idea, four test cases were identified to represent the functional 
safety needs of a “Before Case” system. FMEA, also known as one of the qualitative risk 
assessment techniques, was applied to these four cases. The results of FMEA provided 
different safety requirements for each test case. A Pareto-Chart was used to determine the 
approximate safety requirement for each cause of failure associated with every test case. The 
Risk-Graph analysis was used to verify the result of FMEA and Pareto-Chart. The Risk-
Graph results were used to calculate the exact level of safety requirement for each test case. 
At the end, considering the common operational components, the SIL-3 safety integrity level 
requirement was decided for the total system. With this exercise, it is demonstrated  how the 
qualitative risk assessment techniques were selected and applied on identified functional 
safety needs to determine the safety integrity level requirement of a PLC based control 
system. 
 
In the literature published by many PLC manufacturers, it was found that these 
manufacturers promote totally integrated solutions for a process control and safety. This may 
not be the most effective solution for some applications. However, IEC 61508 standard 
recommends the implementation of independent process control and safety systems. Based 
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on this recommendation, two different PLC control systems were implemented. A non-safety 
PLC based system was implemented for executing normal operations and a safety PLC based 
system was implemented for executing safety-related functions. The IEC 61508 
recommendation was used with various other factors to select the appropriate safety control 
system architecture. With this implementation, it was demonstrated how a customized 
solution is designed by using two products from different manufacturers to achieve desired 
level of safety.  
 
This work includes various phases mentioned in an overall safety lifecycle of IEC 61508. It 
includes overall scope definition, hazard and risk analysis, overall safety requirements, safety 
requirement allocation, safety-related system implementation and overall safety validation. 
Therefore, this work can be used as a guideline to design and implement safety-related 
systems for any industrial application. 
 
7.5 Limitations 
In this thesis, only four test cases were considered to represent the functional safety needs. 
The scope of work is limited to four test cases due to time and hardware resource constraints. 
The scope can be expanded to identify and study all possible functional safety needs (test 
cases) and the safety-related system can be implemented for all these cases with additional 
resources. 
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Due to the discrete nature of the control signals, the Robotic Manufacturing Cell was used as 
an example of Machine Safety. This setup does not include any continuous processes. Hence, 
the Process Safety implementation could not be demonstrated in this setup.  
 
Redundancy is an important availability factor that could have been demonstrated at various 
levels. Due to the limited hardware resources, implementation of redundancy at CPU, I/O 
and communication level could not be achieved. This implementation could have been used 
to demonstrate how the availability affects the safety in case of continuous processes. 
 
The Siemens safety systems are capable of controlling large industrial applications. Due to 
the small laboratory setup, the Siemens technology could not be explored to its full potential. 
However, this thesis can be applied to the real-life manufacturing application to demonstrate 
the safety capabilities of Siemens “Safety Integrated” technology. 
 
 
7.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
In this work, a safety-related system is implemented for Machine-safety mode of operation. 
This work can be expanded by adding continuous processes to implement and analyze 
Process-safety mode of operation. This exercise will provide an opportunity to compare 
requirements of the safety system implementation for two different modes of operation. 
 
Due to the implementation of safety PLC, diagnostic information related to each fault event 
can be recorded. These records contain information such as events of failure, causes of 
failure, and number of times the operator entered in a hazardous work area. A Manufacturing 
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Execution System or Enterprise Resource Planning applications (MES or ERP) can be 
interfaced with the safety PLC to access these records. This information can be used to 
calculate near misses, maintenance costs, system downtime due to each fault and total 
productivity of the system. This exercise will provide an opportunity to relate the safety with 
productivity of the manufacturing system. There is huge potential to demonstrate how safety 
affects the productivity in any manufacturing environment. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Risk Assessment methods based on their scope and principles 
 
Analysis Method Purpose, Scope Principle 
Hazard and operability 
study (HAZOP) 
HAZOP is widely used for 
hazard identification in 
process industry in order to 
discover potential hazards 
and operability problems 
HAZOP studies the potential 
deviations from the intended 
operation conditions. The studies 
are carried out by a 
multidisciplinary team, and the 
key words are used to guide the 
analysts. 
Action error analysis (AEA) AEA considers the 
operational, maintenance, 
control and supervision 
actions performed by a 
human being. The potential 
mistakes in individual 
actions are studied. 
A checklist is used. The effects of 
each potential mistake on safety 
and on system performance, 
recognition of the mistake, and 
potential countermeasures are 
planned 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) FTA models the cause 
sequence leading to the 
TOP event. FTA can be 
used as a quantitative 
method 
The causes are modeled 
backwards, and the probability of 
the TOP event is assessed on the 
basis of this model and reliability 
figures of the system components 
Software fault tree analysis 
(SFTA) 
SFTA is an extension of 
FTA where the TOP event 
is critical software fault 
The software studies backwards 
through the program to the 
software inputs. SFTA attempts to 
prove that the program will not in 
any environment allow a 
particular unsafe output to occur. 
Event tree analysis (ETA) 
 
 
ETA models the sequence 
of potential consequences 
of a hazardous situation or 
ETA works forward starting from 
hazardous situation, and the 
potential consequences are 
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event. ETA can be used as a 
quantitative method 
modeled 
Failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA) 
In FMEA the possible 
failures of the system 
components or subsystems 
and the consequences are 
analyzed systematically. 
FMEA is commonly used 
for mechanical, electrical 
and electronic components 
The components of the system and 
their failures and failure modes 
are listed on a tabular sheet. 
Checklists can be used to support 
the analysis. 
Reliability assessment Reliability assessment 
means quantitative studies 
on potential component and 
equipment failures, their 
causes and consequences 
Block diagram or FTA is used as a 
basis. The most important 
measures in reliability assessment 
are failure rate and time concepts. 
As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) 
ALARP defines the tolerable 
risk as that risk where 
additional spending on risk 
reduction would be in 
disproportion to the actually 
obtainable reduction of risk. 
ALARP takes into account both 
random and systematic errors and 
gives emphasis not only to technical 
requirements, but also to the 
management of the safety activities 
for the whole safety lifecycle. 
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Appendix 2: IEC 61508, 7 part framework 
 
IEC 61508 Part Number Contents Scope and Purpose 
IEC 61508-1 General requirements Tells us how to manage the 
overall safety project by 
using the safety life cycle 
approach. It uses the safety 
life cycle as a framework 
for a set of requirements to 
be carried out at each phase 
of the project. 
IEC 61508-2 Requirements for electrical/ 
electronic/ programmable 
electronic safety-related 
systems. 
Defines SIS design 
requirements and the 
detailed procedures to be 
observed in developing, 
building and testing the 
equipment. 
IEC 61508-3 Software requirements Details the software 
engineering practices that 
must be observed for a 
programmable system to 
qualify for safety duties. It 
scales the special 
engineering requirements 
against the SILs. This part 
is largely aimed at 
developers of operating 
systems for safety-certified 
components 
IEC 61508-4 Definitions and 
abbreviations 
Provides definitions of 
terms 
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IEC 61508-5 Examples of methods for 
the determination of safety 
integrity levels 
Provides advice on methods 
of determining the SIL 
requirements from 
information obtained from 
hazard studies. It also 
defines various methods of 
quantitative and qualitative 
analysis including risk 
graphs. 
IEC 61508-6 Guidelines on the 
application of IEC 61508-2 
and IEC 61508-3 
Provides guidance on how 
to carry out the 
requirements defined in 
parts 1, 2 and 3. In 
particular, this part contains 
useful sections on how to 
do the reliability 
calculations used to 
evaluate the SIL of a 
proposed design 
IEC 61508-7 Overview of measures and 
techniques. 
Provides references to 
further reading and 
techniques used in support 
of the SIS design work. 
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Appendix 3: List of the pins on the DI/ DO C2 connector and their function 
 
Digital Inputs Digital Outputs 
Pin Description Pin Description 
A DI01 (Note 1) e Cycle Running (Note 6) 
B DI02 (Note 2) f Error (Note 7) 
C DI03 g At home (Note 8) 
D DI04 h Unable to move home (Note 9) 
E DI05 j Common for e, f, g, h 
F DI06 k Common for q, r, s, t 
G DI07 m Common for y, z, AA, AB 
H DI08 n Common for AC, AD, AE, AF 
J DI09 p Common for u, v, w, x 
K DI10 q DO01 (Note 10) 
L DI11 r DO02 (Note 11) 
M DI12/ Command bit 0 s DO03 
N DI13/ Command bit 1 t DO04 
O DI14/ Command bit 2 u DO05 
P DI15/ Command bit 3 v DO06 
R DI16/ Command bit 4 w DO07 
S DI Ground x DO08 
T DI Ground y DO09 
U DI Ground z DO10 
V DI Ground AA DO11/ Manipulator power 
W Inhibit move to home  (Note 3) AB DO12/ Online 
X Emergency stop (Note 4) AC DO13/ Manual Mode 
Y Manipulator power (Note 5) AD DO14/ Cycsle stopping 
Z Manipulator power (Note 5) AE DO15/ Overtime 
a Not Used/ Command Strobe AF DO16/ Op Panel disabled 
b Not used AG Controller frame ground (Note 12) 
c Not used     
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d Not used     
 
Note 1 Can only be used for Z axis down 
Note 2 Can only be used for Z axis up 
Note 3 Connecting this point to DI ground will inhibit movement to home position (See note 9) 
Note 4 Connecting this point to DI ground will provide an emergency stop function 
Note 5 Connecting points Y and Z together will provide a manipulator power ON function 
Note 6 DO point is ON during auto mode 
Note 7 DO point is ON during error condition 
Note 8 DO point is ON when arms at home position 
Note 9 DO point is ON when return Home key is pressed and point W is connected to ground 
Note 10 Can only be used for moving Z axis 
Note 11 For gripper, if installed 
Note 12 Controller frame ground 
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Appendix 4: List of 5-bits command codes and applicable function 
 
 
Command Code 
Function DI # 
12 13 14 15 16 
            
0 1 0 0 1 Auto Mode 
0 1 1 1 1 Disable operator panel 
1 1 1 1 0 Enable operator panel 
0 0 1 1 0 Recall memory 
0 1 0 1 0 Reset Error 
1 0 0 0 1 Return home 
1 1 0 0 0 Select application 1 
0 0 1 0 1 Select application 2 
1 0 1 0 0 Select application 3 
0 1 1 0 0 Select application 4 
1 1 1 0 1 Select application 5 
0 0 0 1 1 Start cycle 
1 0 1 1 1 Step 
1 1 0 1 1 Stop and memory 
1 0 0 1 0 Stop cycle 
 
   117
Appendix 5: I/O list for PLC, Robot and sensors connection 
 
 
Rack #2 Connections: 
 
RACK#2 (ROBOT 1) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:020/0 I:020/0 R1 Cycle Done Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:020/1 I:020/1 R1 Inspection Done Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:020/2 I:020/2 End Effector Error Robot1: Send Robot Output Robot DO 003 (s) 
I:020/3 I:020/3       
I:020/4 I:020/4       
I:020/5 I:020/5       
I:020/6 I:020/6 Cycle Running- Robot 1 
Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:020/7 I:020/7 Error - Robot 1 Robot DO (f) 
I:020/10 I:020/8 At Home - Robot 1 Robot DO (g) 
I:020/11 I:020/9 Unable to move Home - Robot 1 
Robot Internal Output 
Robot DO (h) 
I:020/12 I:020/10 Manipulator Power ON - Robot 1 Robot DO11 (AA) 
I:020/13 I:020/11 Online - Robot 1 Robot DO12 (AB) 
I:020/14 I:020/12 Manual Mode - Robot 1 Robot DO13 (AC) 
   118
I:020/15 I:020/13 Cycle stopping - Robot 1 Robot DO14 (AD) 
I:020/16 I:020/14 Overtime - Robot 1 Robot DO15 (AE) 
I:020/17 I:020/15 Op Panel Disabled - Robot 1 Robot DO16 (AF) 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:020/0 O:020/0 R1 Error Clear Robot Input  Robot DI 001(A) 
O:020/1 O:020/1 R1 Start Cycle  Robot Input  Robot DI 002(B) 
O:020/2 O:020/2       
O:020/3 O:020/3       
O:020/4 O:020/4       
O:020/5 O:020/5       
O:020/6 O:020/6       
O:020/7 O:020/7 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 1 
Robot Internal Input 
Robot DI (W) (Grnd) 
O:020/10 O:020/8 Emergency Stop - Robot 1 Robot DI (X)  (Grnd) 
O:020/11 O:020/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z)- Robot 1 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:020/12 O:020/10 Command Strobe - Robot 1 
Robot Internal  
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:020/13 O:020/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 1 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:020/14 O:020/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 1 Robot DI 013 (N) 
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O:020/15 O:020/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 1 Robot DI 014 (O) 
O:020/16 O:020/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 1 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:020/17 O:020/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 1 Robot DI 016 (R) 
End Effector Robot1 Robot D1 003 (C) 
Input Ground Robot 1 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
Output Ground Robot 1 Robot DO (j, k, l, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 1 Robot  (AG) 
 
 
Rack #4 Connections 
 
RACK#4 (ROBOT 2) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:040/0 I:040/0 R2 Cycle Done  Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:040/1 I:040/1 Pen picked (Done) Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:040/2 I:040/2 Char Done Robot Output Robot DO 003 (s) 
I:040/3 I:040/3 End Effector Error Robot2: Send Robot Output Robot DO 004 (t) 
I:040/4 I:040/4       
I:040/5 I:040/5       
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I:040/6 I:040/6 Cycle Running - Robot 2 
Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:040/7 I:040/7 Error- Robot 2 Robot DO (f) 
I:040/10 I:040/8 At Home- Robot 2 Robot DO (g) 
I:040/11 I:040/9 Unable to move Home -Robot 2 
Robot Internal Output 
Robot DO (h) 
I:040/12 I:040/10 Manipulator power ON- Robot 2 Robot DO 011 (AA) 
I:040/13 I:040/11 Online- Robot 2 Robot DO 012 (AB) 
I:040/14 I:040/12 Manual Mode- Robot 2 Robot DO 013 (AC) 
I:040/15 I:040/13 Cycle stopping- Robot 2 Robot DO 014 (AD) 
I:040/16 I:040/14 Overtime- Robot 2 Robot DO 015 (AE) 
I:040/17 I:040/15 Op Panel Disabled- Robot 2 Robot DO 016 (AF) 
 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:040/0 O:040/0 Char bit 0/ Pen select 1 Robot Input  Robot DI 001 (A) 
O:040/1 O:040/1 Char bit 1/Pen select 2 Robot Input  Robot DI 002 (B) 
O:040/2 O:040/2 Char bit 2 Robot Input  Robot DI 003 (C) 
O:040/3 O:040/3 Char bit 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 004 (D) 
O:040/4 O:040/4 Char bit 4 Robot Input  Robot DI 005 (E) 
O:040/5 O:040/5 Read Next Char Robot Input  Robot DI 006 (F) 
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O:040/6 O:040/6 R2 Error Clear: end effector  Robot Input  Robot DI 009 (I) 
O:040/7 O:040/7 R2 Start Cycle/Pen check done Robot Input  Robot DI 007 (G) 
O:040/10 O:040/8 Emergency Stop - Robot 2 Robot Internal Input Robot DI (X) (Grnd) 
O:040/11 O:040/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z) - Robot 2 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:040/12 O:040/10 Command Strobe - Robot 2 
Robot Internal  
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:040/13 O:040/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 2 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:040/14 O:040/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 2 Robot DI 013 (N) 
O:040/15 O:040/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 2 Robot DI 014 (O) 
O:040/16 O:040/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 2 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:040/17 O:040/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 2 Robot DI 016 (R) 
End Effector Robot 2 Robot DI 008 (H) 
Input Ground Robot 2 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
Output Ground Robot 2 Robot DO (j, k, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 2 Robot  (AG) 
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Rack #1 Connections 
 
RACK#1 (ROBOT 3) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:010/0 I:010/0 R3 Cycle Done  Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:010/1 I:010/1 **********Not used********** 
I:010/2 I:010/2 End Effector Error Robot 3 Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:010/3 I:010/3       
I:010/4 I:010/4       
I:010/5 I:010/5       
I:010/6 I:010/6 Cycle running- Robot 3 
Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:010/7 I:010/7 Error- Robot 3 Robot DO (f) 
I:010/10 I:010/8 At home- Robot 3 Robot DO (g) 
I:010/11 I:010/9 Unable to move Home -Robot 3 
Robot Internal Output 
Robot DO (h) 
I:010/12 I:010/10 Manipulator power ON- Robot 3 Robot DO 011 (AA) 
I:010/13 I:010/11 Online- Robot 3 Robot DO 012 (AB) 
I:010/14 I:010/12 Manual Mode- Robot 3 Robot DO 013 (AC) 
I:010/15 I:010/13 Cycle stopping- Robot 3 Robot DO 014 (AD) 
   123
I:010/16 I:010/14 Overtime- Robot 3 Robot DO 015 (AE) 
I:060/17 I:010/15 Op Panel Disabled- Robot 3 Robot DO 016 (AF) 
 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:010/0 O:010/0 Start Cycle to Robot 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 001 (A) 
O:010/1 O:010/1 Error Clear : Robot 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 002 (B) 
O:010/2 O:010/2 Bad from Vision system (1/0) Camera  output Robot DI 003 (C) 
O:010/3 O:010/3 Good from Vision system (1/0) Camera  output Robot DI 003 (D) 
O:010/4 O:010/4       
O:010/5 O:010/5       
O:010/6 O:010/6 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 2 
Robot Internal Input 
Robot DI (W) ( Grnd) 
O:010/7 O:010/7 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 3 Robot DI (W) (Grnd) 
O:010/10 O:010/8 Emergency Stop - Robot 3 Robot DI (X) (Grnd) 
O:010/11 O:010/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z) - Robot 3 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:010/12 O:010/10 Command Strobe - Robot 3 
Robot Internal 
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:010/13 O:010/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 3 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:010/14 O:010/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 3 Robot DI 013 (N) 
O:010/15 O:010/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 3 Robot DI 014 (O) 
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O:010/16 O:010/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 3 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:060/17 O:010/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 3 Robot DI 016 (R) 
End Effector Robot 3 Robot D1 004 (D) 
Input Ground Robot 3 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
Output Ground Robot 3 Robot DO (j, k, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 3 Robot  (AG) 
 
 
Rack  #6 Connections 
 
RACK#6 (Conveyor) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:060/0 I:060/0 Pallet Present @ Station 0 
On Conveyor 
Proximity sensor 
I:060/1 I:060/1 Pallet Present @ Station 1 
I:060/2 I:060/2 Pallet Present @ Station 2 
I:060/3 I:060/3 Pallet Present @ Station 3 
I:060/4 I:060/4 Pallet Present @ Station 4 
I:060/5 I:060/5 Pallet placed correctly 
I:060/6 I:060/6 Pallet present before st0 Light beam sensor 
I:060/7 I:060/7 Paper Stack Empty On Paper Feeder  
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I:060/10 I:060/8 Pen present 1 @ feeder 2 
On Pen Feeder I:060/11 I:060/9 Pen present 2 @ feeder 2 
I:060/12 I:060/10 Pen present 3 @ feeder 2 
I:060/13 I:060/11 output 1: pass   Vision System 
I:060/14 I:060/12 output 2: busy   
I:060/15 I:060/13       
I:060/16 I:060/14       
I:060/17 I:060/15       
 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:060/0 O:060/0 Motor Running Relay Logic motor 
O:060/1 O:060/1 Trigger     
O:060/2 O:060/2       
O:060/3 O:060/3       
O:060/4 O:060/4       
O:060/5 O:060/5       
O:060/6 O:060/6       
O:060/7 O:060/7       
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O:060/10 O:060/8       
O:060/11 O:060/9       
O:060/12 O:060/10       
O:060/13 O:060/11       
O:060/14 O:060/12       
O:060/15 O:060/13       
O:060/16 O:060/14       
O:060/17 O:060/15       
 
 
Rack #3 Connections 
 
RACK#3 (Conveyor) AC Module 
Datafile PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:030/0 SA
M
E
 as
 O
C
TA
L
 
Motor Input  relay logic From the start and stop switches 
I:030/1       
I:030/2       
I:030/3       
I:030/4       
I:030/5       
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I:030/6       
I:030/7       
I:030/10       
I:030/11       
I:030/12       
I:030/13       
I:030/14       
I:030/15       
I:030/16       
I:030/17       
 
 
Datafile PLC Rack Description  Type External Device 
O:030/0 
SA
M
E
 as
 O
C
TA
L
 
Stopper at Station0 
Pneumatics On Conveyor 
O:030/1 Stopper at Station1 
O:030/2 Stopper at Station2 
O:030/3 Stopper at Station3 
O:030/4 Stopper at Station4 
O:030/5 Clamp at Station1 
O:030/6 Clamp at Station2 
O:030/7 Pneumatic Clamp at Station3 
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O:030/10       
O:030/11       
O:030/12       
O:030/13       
O:030/14       
O:030/15       
O:030/16       
O:030/17       
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Appendix 6: The wiring schematic for the connection between Robot I/Os and PLC 
I/Os 
 
 
Robot DI/ DO Integration with PLC: 
 
Connection from PLC DO to Robot DI: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connection from Robot DO to PLC DI: 
 
NC
C
NO
A1
A2
24Vdc Relay
PLC DO
24Vdc
RET 
DO 
Vdc + -
DI
DI GND
Robot DI 
 
PLC DI
24Vdc
DO Com 
Robot DO
-+ RET 
DI 
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Appendix 7: List of the sensors and actuators and their location 
 
Sensors: 
 
Sr. 
No. 
Sensor Input Type of sensor PLC 
Interface 
Make 
 
1 Pallet placed correctly before 
station 0 
Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
2 Pallet Present @ Station 0 Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
3 Pallet Present @ Station 1 Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
4 Pallet Present @ Station 2 Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
5 Pallet Present @ Station 3 Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
6 Pallet Present @ Station 4 Proximity Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
7 Paper Stack Empty Photo Beam Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
8 Pen 1 present @ Pen Feeder Photo Beam Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
9 Pen 2 present @ Pen Feeder Photo Beam Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
10 Pen 3 present @ Pen Feeder Photo Beam Sensor DI Banner 
Engineering 
11 START  Momentary Push 
Button- Green 
Hardwired Allen-Bradley 
12 STOP Momentary Push 
Button- Red 
Hardwired Allen-Bradley 
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Actuators: 
 
Sr. 
No. 
Actuator Output Type of sensor PLC 
Interface 
Make 
 
1 Stopper at Station0 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
2 Stopper at Station1 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
3 Stopper at Station2 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
4 Stopper at Station3 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
5 Stopper at Station4 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
6 Clamp at Station1 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
7 Clamp at Station2 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
8 Clamp at Station3 Pneumatic Solenoid Relay DO SMC 
9 Conveyor Motor Hardwired Leeson 
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Appendix 8: The wiring schematic of the motor control operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HMI START bit I:030/0
L
O:060/0
HMI START bit
U
O:060/0
I:030/0
LADDER LOGIC
PLC Digital AC Input 
Module
I: 030/0
120VAC
START Momentary PB
With NO
STOP Momentary PB
With NC
M
120VAC
1NO
1Com
120VAC
2NO
2Com
Conveyor running
O: 060/0 
HARDWARE CIRCUIT
Siemens Relay
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Appendix 9: Flow chart for Robot 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If 
Robo1start 
= 1 ? 
Move to Paperpick 
position 
Extend the arm to 
pick the paper 
Grasp the paper by 
using vaccum cups 
Retract the arm and 
hold the paper 
Carry the paper to 
Station 1 pallet 
position 
Place the paper on 
the pallet 
Retract the arm  
Send Robo1done 
signal to PLC  
     END 
Yes 
Move the Robot 
Arm to FH1 position 
No 
  START 
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Appendix 10: Flow chart for Robot 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
  START 
A 
If 
Robo2start 
= 1 ? 
Goto selected pen location 
and grasp a pen  
Calculate the selected pen 
no. 
Send Penpickdone = 1 to the 
PLC  
Calculate the home position 
based on value of the 
“printed characters” counter 
Read the 5-bit digital code 
at the digital inputs and 
calculate the decimal 
equivalent of the character 
Goto the respective 
character subroutine and 
write a character 
Yes 
B 
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     END 
Place the pen at its original 
location on the pen feeder 
Send the Robo2done signal 
to the PLC 
Is value of 
counter  
>3? 
Send chardone= 1 to PLC 
and increment the “printed 
characters” counter 
A 
B 
No 
Yes 
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Appendix 11: Robot 1 AML program 
 
 
--** POINTS DECLARED **-- 
FH1: NEW PT(12,22,0,0); 
PAPERPICK: NEW PT(10,22,0,0); 
DOWN: NEW -5; 
UP: NEW 0; 
DROP1: NEW PT(-10,20,0,0); 
---------***** DI DECLARED ******---------------------- 
ROBO1START: NEW 2;  --INPUT-- 
ERRORCLEAR: NEW 1;  --INPUT-- 
---------***** DO DECLARED ******---------------------- 
ROBO1DONE: NEW 1;   --OUTPUT-- 
ROBO1INSPECDONE: NEW 2; --OUTPUT-- 
SENDERROR: NEW 3;   --OUTPUT-- 
--------****END OF DECLARATION AND START OF MAIN PROGRAM****-------- 
MAIN: SUBR; 
   WRITEO(ROBO1DONE,0); 
   PMOVE(FH1); 
  LABEL2: 
   TESTI(ROBO1START,1,LABEL1); 
   BRANCH(LABEL2); 
  LABEL1: 
   PMOVE(PAPERPICK); 
   ZMOVE(DOWN); 
   GRASP;                       --PAPER GRASPED FROM THE FEEDER STACK-- 
   ZMOVE(UP); 
   PMOVE(DROP1); 
   PAYLOAD(1); 
   ZMOVE(DOWN); 
   RELEASE;                         -- PAPER PLACED ON THE PALLET-- 
   ZMOVE(UP); 
   WRITEO(ROBO1DONE,1); 
   END; 
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Appendix 12: Robot 2 AML program 
 
 
---------------****** CONSTANTS DECLARED ******----------------- 
 RESULT: STATIC COUNTER; 
 CHARNUM: STATIC COUNTER; 
 PENRESULT: STATIC COUNTER; 
 PENDOWNDONE: STATIC COUNTER; 
 PT1: NEW 0.2; 
 PT2: NEW 0.4; 
 PT3: NEW 0.6; 
 PT4: NEW 0.8; 
 PT5: NEW 1.0; 
 PT6: NEW 1.2; 
 UP: NEW 0; 
 DOWN: NEW -0.327; 
 PENDOWN: NEW -3.841; 
 ---------------****** POINTS DECLARED ******------------------- 
 HP1: NEW PT(-1.9,23.5,0,-60); 
 HP2: NEW PT(-0.2,23.450,0,-60); 
 HP3: NEW PT(1.1,23.450,0,-60); 
 FH2: NEW PT(20,12,0,-60); 
 PICKPEN1: NEW PT(10,16.5,0,-60); 
 PICKPEN2: NEW PT(13,16.520,0,-60); 
 PICKPEN3: NEW PT(16.750,16.60,0,-60); 
------------------****  DI DECLARED****---------------------- 
 NEXTCHAR: NEW 6;                --DI006(F) INITIALIZED-- 
 ROBO2START: NEW 7;              --DI007(G) INITIALIZED-- 
 ENDEFFECTOR: NEW 8;             --DI008(H) INITIALIZED-- 
 ERRORCLEAR: NEW 9;              --DI009(I) INITIALIZED-- 
------------------**** DO DECLARED****---------------------- 
 ROBO2DONE: NEW 1;               --DO001(Q) INITIALIZED-- 
 PENPICKDONE: NEW 2;             --DO002(R) INITIALIZED-- 
 CHARDONE: NEW 3;                --DO003(S) INITIALIZED-- 
 SENDERROR: NEW 4;               --DO004(T) INITIALIZED-- 
-----------------****** MAIN PROGRAM ******------------------ 
 MAIN: SUBR; 
--------------****** TESTDIS SUBROUTINE ****** --------------- 
 TESTDIS:SUBR(FIRST,LAST); 
      SETC(RESULT,0); 
    LOOP: 
      COMPC(FIRST LT LAST, DONE); 
      SETC(RESULT,2*RESULT+TESTI(FIRST)); 
      DECR(FIRST); 
      BRANCH(LOOP); 
   DONE: 
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       END; 
 -----------****** NUM SUBROUTINE ******----------------- 
  NUM: SUBR; 
      TESTC(CHARNUM,1,HOME1); 
      TESTC(CHARNUM,2,HOME2); 
      TESTC(CHARNUM,3,HOME3); 
    HOME1: 
      PMOVE(HP1); 
      BRANCH(DONE1); 
    HOME2: 
      PMOVE(HP2); 
      BRANCH(DONE1); 
    HOME3: 
      PMOVE(HP3); 
      BRANCH(DONE1); 
    DONE1: 
      END; 
----------------*****PICK PEN SUBROUTINE ***** ----------------- 
 
 PICKPEN:SUBR(ONE,TWO); 
      SETC(PENRESULT,0); 
    LOOP: 
      COMPC(ONE LT TWO, DONE); 
      SETC(PENRESULT,2*PENRESULT+TESTI(ONE)); 
      DECR(ONE); 
      BRANCH(LOOP); 
   DONE: 
       END; 
 ------------------****PEN DROP SUBROUTINE****------------------ 
  PENDROP: SUBR; 
    TESTC(PENRESULT,1,PEN1DROP); 
    TESTC(PENRESULT,2,PEN2DROP); 
    TESTC(PENRESULT,3,PEN3DROP); 
  PEN1DROP: 
    PMOVE(PICKPEN1); 
    DELAY(1); 
    ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
    DELAY(1); 
    RELEASE; 
    DELAY(1); 
    ZMOVE(UP); 
    DELAY(1); 
    PMOVE(FH2); 
    BRANCH(ROBODONE); 
  PEN2DROP: 
    PMOVE(PICKPEN2); 
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    DELAY(1); 
    ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
    DELAY(1); 
    RELEASE; 
    DELAY(1); 
    ZMOVE(UP); 
    DELAY(1); 
    PMOVE(FH2); 
    BRANCH(ROBODONE); 
  PEN3DROP: 
    PMOVE(PICKPEN3); 
    DELAY(1); 
    ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
    DELAY(1); 
    RELEASE; 
    DELAY(1); 
    WRITEO(PENPICKDONE,0); 
    ZMOVE(UP); 
    DELAY(1); 
    PMOVE(FH2); 
    BRANCH(ROBODONE); 
  ROBODONE: 
    END; 
 
-----****END OF SUBROUTINE AND START OF MAIN PRGM****------------- 
 
 START: 
  WRITEO(CHARDONE,0); 
  WRITEO(PENPICKDONE,0); 
  WRITEO(ROBO2DONE,0); 
  TESTI(ROBO2START,1,PENSELECT); 
  BRANCH(START); 
  PENSELECT: 
  PICKPEN(2,1); 
  TESTC(PENRESULT,1,P1); 
  TESTC(PENRESULT,2,P2); 
  TESTC(PENRESULT,3,P3); 
  BRANCH(PENSELECT); 
 P1: 
   PMOVE(PICKPEN1); 
   ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
   BRANCH(PENPICKED); 
 P2: 
   PMOVE(PICKPEN2); 
   ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
   BRANCH(PENPICKED); 
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 P3: 
   PMOVE(PICKPEN3); 
   ZMOVE(PENDOWN); 
   BRANCH(PENPICKED); 
 PENPICKED: 
   DELAY(1); 
   GRASP; 
   DELAY(1); 
   ZMOVE(UP); 
   WRITEO(PENPICKDONE,1); 
   PMOVE(HP1); 
   SETC(CHARNUM,1); 
   LINEAR(1); 
 LABEL3: 
  TESTI(NEXTCHAR,1,LABEL1); 
  BRANCH(LABEL3); 
 LABEL1: 
  NUM; 
 LABEL2: 
  TESTDIS(5,1); 
  WRITEO(CHARDONE,1); 
  TESTC(RESULT,0,LABEL2); 
  TESTC(RESULT,1,A); 
  TESTC(RESULT,2,B); 
  TESTC(RESULT,3,C); 
  TESTC(RESULT,4,D); 
  TESTC(RESULT,5,E); 
  TESTC(RESULT,6,F); 
  TESTC(RESULT,7,G); 
  TESTC(RESULT,8,H); 
  TESTC(RESULT,9,I); 
  TESTC(RESULT,10,J); 
  TESTC(RESULT,11,K); 
  TESTC(RESULT,12,L); 
  TESTC(RESULT,13,M); 
  TESTC(RESULT,14,N); 
  TESTC(RESULT,15,O); 
  TESTC(RESULT,16,P); 
  TESTC(RESULT,17,Q); 
  TESTC(RESULT,18,R); 
  TESTC(RESULT,19,S); 
  TESTC(RESULT,20,T); 
  TESTC(RESULT,21,U); 
  TESTC(RESULT,22,V); 
  TESTC(RESULT,23,W); 
  TESTC(RESULT,24,X); 
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  TESTC(RESULT,25,Y); 
  TESTC(RESULT,26,Z); 
 DONE2: 
    WRITEO(CHARDONE,0); 
    INCR(CHARNUM); 
    COMPC(CHARNUM <=3,LABEL3); 
    WRITEO(ROBO2DONE,1); 
    LINEAR(0); 
    PENDROP; 
    WRITEO(PENPICKDONE,0); 
    BRANCH(OVER); 
  A: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE (<PT2,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE (<PT2,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE (<-PT3,PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  B: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  C: 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
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      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  D: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  E: 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  F: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  G: 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,PT5,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
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      DPMOVE(<0,PT2,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  H: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  I: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  J: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT5,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  K: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
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      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  L: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  M: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,-PT2,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,PT2,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  N: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,-PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  O: 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
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  P: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  Q: 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT4,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  R: 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT3,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT3,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  S: 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,PT4,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
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      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT1,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  T: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  U: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<0,-PT5,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT1,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT5,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  V: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,-PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  W: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT3,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,-PT3,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT1,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
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  X: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,-PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  Y: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT2,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT2,-PT3,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  Z: 
      DPMOVE(<0,PT6,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(DOWN); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<-PT4,-PT6,0,0>); 
      DPMOVE(<PT4,0,0,0>); 
      ZMOVE(UP); 
      BRANCH(DONE2); 
  OVER: 
    DELAY(2); 
    WRITEO(ROBO2DONE,0); 
    END; 
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Appendix 13: Flow chart for Main program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  START 
Check the Hardwired Start 
and Stop conditions to 
operate the motor 
Read motor start signal 
from HMI screen 
Read the pallet present at 
Station 0 signal and stop all 
the pallets at station 0 
Release the pallet from 
station 0, read the pallet 
present at station 1 signal and 
stop and hold the pallet at 
station 1 
Call R1 Startup 
and R2 Startup 
subroutines 
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Is R1 and 
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No 
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Read the pallet present at 
station 2 signal and stop and 
hold the pallet at station 2 
A 
Send chardone= 1 to PLC 
and increment the “printed 
characters” counter 
Send Robot 1 start signal to 
Robot 1 and wait for Robot 1 
done signal from Robot 1 
Release the pallet from 
station 0, read the pallet 
present at station 1 signal and 
stop and hold the pallet at 
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Release the pallet from 
station 1 when Robot 1 is 
done and the station 2 does 
not have any pallet  
Read the Enter Data signal 
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B 
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     END 
Send Robot 2 start signal to 
Robot 2 and wait for Robot 2 
done signal from Robot 2 
Call Checkdata 
subroutine 
Perform data reset in case of 
Robot 2 error or Robot 2 
ESTOP  
Call Pencheck 
subroutine 
Call Sendchar 
subroutine 
B 
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Appendix 14: Flow chart and function details for R1 Startup subroutine 
 
Functions: 
• Initialize the Robot 1 
• Return to Home position 
• Change to Auto mode 
• Select the application 
• Start the application 
• Reset internal Error 
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Flow Chart 
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C 
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C 
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Appendix 15: Flow chart and function details for R2 Startup subroutine 
 
Functions: 
• Initialize the Robot 2 
• Return to Home position 
• Change to Auto mode 
• Select the application 
• Start the application 
• Reset internal Error 
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Flow Chart: 
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C 
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Appendix 16: Flow chart and function details for Pen Check subroutine 
 
Functions: 
• Reads the selected pen data from HMI screen 
• Checks if the selected pen is available on the Pen feeder station 
• If not, generate the pen absent signal 
• In case the pen is not available, sends the default pen value to the file 
 
 
  Flow Chart 
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Appendix 17: Flow chart and function details for Pen Check subroutine 
 
Functions: 
• Reads the characters entered from the HMI screen  
• Validates the entered value 
• Converts this information into the decimal number 
• Loads the validated values into the file 
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string 
Store all three characters and 
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Program 
Is EnterData 
signal =1? 
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Split the string and convert 
the data into usable decimal 
format 
Read the pen color data and 
covert into usable decimal 
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Appendix 18: Flow chart and function details for Send Char subroutine 
 
Functions: 
• Unloads all three characters subsequently  
• Sends the equivalent binary count to the Robot 2 
• Synchronizes the charactering sending with Robot 2 chardone and nextchar 
signals 
 
 
 
Flow Chart 
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Wait for chardone from 
Robot 2 
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Program 
Is Pen pick 
done= 1? 
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No 
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No 
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Appendix 19: HMI Display Screen- Main 
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Appendix 20: HMI Display Screen- Station 1 
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Appendix 21: HMI Display Screen- Station 2 
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Appendix 22: HMI Display Screen- Station 1 Status 
1
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Appendix 23: HMI Display Screen- Station 2 Status 
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Appendix 24: HMI Display Screen- Data Entry 
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Appendix 25: List of Siemens Safety I/O modules and Siemens safety sensors 
 
Safety I/Os: 
 
Safety system 
Rack 
Module No. Module Name Module Type Part No. 
Safety CPU Rack PS307-5A Power Supply, 5A General Purpose 6ES7 307-1EA00-0AA0 
CPU 315F-2PN/DP CPU  Safety 6ES7 315-2FH13-0AB0 
Safety Protector Safety Protector Safety 195-7KF00-0XA0 
SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V 24 ch Digital Input Module Safety 6ES7 326-1BK01-0AB0 
SM 326, 8 DO; DC 24V 8 ch Digital Output Module Safety 6ES7 326-2BF40-0AB0 
Distributed Safety 
I/O Rack 
IM 151- 3 PN Distributed I/O Head Module General Purpose 6ES7 151-3BA22-0AB0 
PM-E 24V Power Terminal Module General Purpose 6ES7 138-4CA50-0AB0 
2DI-HF- 1 2 ch Digital Input Module General Purpose 6ES7 131-4BB01-0AB0 
2DI-HF- 2 2 ch Digital Input Module General Purpose 6ES7 131-4BB01-0AB0 
2DI-HF- 3 2 ch Digital Input Module General Purpose 6ES7 131-4BB01-0AB0 
PM-E 24V Power Terminal Module General Purpose 6ES7 138-4CA50-0AB0 
4/8 F-DI- 1 4/ 8 ch Digital Input Module Safety 6ES7 138-4FA03-0AB0 
4/8 F-DI- 2 4/ 8 ch Digital Input Module Safety 6ES7 138-4FA03-0AB0 
PM-E 24V Power Terminal Module General Purpose 6ES7 138-4CA50-0AB0 
4 F-DO 4 ch Digital Output Module Safety 6ES7 138-4FB02-0AB0 
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 PM-E 24V Power Terminal Module General Purpose 6ES7 138-4CA50-0AB0 
2 DO-HF- 1 2 ch Digital Output Module General Purpose 6ES7 132-4BB01-0AB0 
2 DO-HF- 2 2 ch Digital Output Module General Purpose 6ES7 132-4BB01-0AB0 
2 DO-HF- 3 2 ch Digital Output Module General Purpose 6ES7 132-4BB01-0AB0 
Terminator Terminator Module General Purpose   
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Safety Sensors: 
 
Test case 1: 
Sensor Name Description Sensor Type Part No. 
K11  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
K12  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
DG 5-way actuation Position Switch with 2 NC contacts Safety 3SE3 200-6XX13 
 
Test case 2A+2B: 
Sensor Name Description Sensor Type Part No. 
K21  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
K22  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
LCT Transmitter for Light Curtains Safety 3RG78454DB00 
LCR Receiver for Light Curtains Safety 3RG78454DB01 
 
Test case 3: 
Sensor Name Description Sensor Type Part No. 
K31  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
K32  Contactor with Permanent Aux Contacts Safety 3RT1015-1BB44-3MA0 
Mag. Door 1 Magnetically operated switch Safety 3SE6 704-2BA  
Safety 3SE6 604-2BA 
Mag. Door 2 Magnetically operated switch Safety 3SE6 704-3BA  
Safety 3SE6 605-3BA 
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Common: 
Sensor Name Description Sensor Type Part No. 
START Green ILPB with NO Contact General Purpose 3SB30010AA41 
STOP Red ILPB with NC Contact General Purpose 3SB30010AA21  
ACK Blue ILPB with NO Contact General Purpose 3SB30010AA51 
Muting Lamp Indicator Light with holder, Clear General Purpose 3SB30016AA70 
MS_11 Toggle switch General Purpose   
MS_12 Toggle switch General Purpose   
MS_21 Toggle switch General Purpose   
MS_22 Toggle switch General Purpose   
ESTOP 12 SIGNUM 3SB3 ACTUATOR EMERGENCY-STOP with 2 
NC contacts 
Safety 3SB35001FA20 
ESTOP 3 E-Stop Pushbutton Station with 2 NC contacts Safety 3SB38010DG3 
ESTOP ALL E-Stop Pushbutton Station with 2 NC contacts Safety 3SB38010DG3 
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Appendix 26: The I/O list for safety PLC and associated sensors connections 
 
 
Signal Name Module No. IO 
Type 
Channel 
No. 
Voting 
Configuration 
Address 
START SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 0 1oo1 I 0.0 
ACK SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 1 1oo1 I 0.1 
STOP SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 2 1oo1 I 0.2 
MS_11 SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 12 1oo1 I 1.4 
MS_12 SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 13 1oo1 I 1.5 
MS_21 SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 14 1oo1 I 1.6 
MS_22 SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 15 1oo1 I 1.7 
ESTOP-ALL SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 6, 18 1oo2 I 0.4 
OSSD SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 7, 19 1oo2 I 0.7 
Mag. Door SM 326 DI 24 X DC24V DI 8, 20 1oo2 I 1.0 
Muting Lamp SM 326, 8 DO; DC 24V DO 0  Readback Q 10.0 
START 
Lamp 
SM 326, 8 DO; DC 24V DO 1  Readback Q 10.1 
ACK Lamp SM 326, 8 DO; DC 24V DO 4  Readback Q 10.4 
STOP Lamp SM 326, 8 DO; DC 24V DO 5  Readback Q 10.5 
K11_NC 2DI-HF- 1 DI 0  1oo1 I 42.0 
K12_NC 2DI-HF- 1 DI 1  1oo1 I 42.1 
K21_NC 2DI-HF- 2 DI 0  1oo1 I 43.0 
K22_NC 2DI-HF- 2 DI 1  1oo1 I 43.1 
K31_NC 2DI-HF- 3 DI 0  1oo1 I 37.0 
K32_NC 2DI-HF- 3 DI 1  1oo1 I 37.1 
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Appendix 27: The modified I/O list after implementation of the “After Case” system 
 
Rack #2 Connections: 
 
RACK #2 (ROBOT 1) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:020/0 I:020/0 R1 Cycle Done Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:020/1 I:020/1 R1 Inspection Done Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:020/2 I:020/2 End Effector Error Robot1: Send Robot Output Robot DO 003 (s) 
I:020/3 I:020/3  R1_Healthy     
I:020/4 I:020/4  Motor_Healthy     
I:020/5 I:020/5       
I:020/6 I:020/6 Cycle Running- Robot 1 Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:020/7 I:020/7 Error - Robot 1 Robot DO (f) 
I:020/10 I:020/8 At Home - Robot 1 Robot DO (g) 
I:020/11 I:020/9 Unable to move Home - Robot 1 Robot Internal Output Robot DO (h) 
I:020/12 I:020/10 Manipulator Power ON - Robot 1 Robot DO11 (AA) 
I:020/13 I:020/11 Online - Robot 1 Robot DO12 (AB) 
I:020/14 I:020/12 Manual Mode - Robot 1 Robot DO13 (AC) 
I:020/15 I:020/13 Cycle stopping - Robot 1 Robot DO14 (AD) 
I:020/16 I:020/14 Overtime - Robot 1 Robot DO15 (AE) 
I:020/17 I:020/15 Op Panel Disabled - Robot 1 Robot DO16 (AF) 
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Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:020/0 O:020/0 R1 Error Clear Robot Input  Robot DI 001(A) 
O:020/1 O:020/1 R1 Start Cycle  Robot Input  Robot DI 002(B) 
O:020/2 O:020/2       
O:020/3 O:020/3       
O:020/4 O:020/4       
O:020/5 O:020/5       
O:020/6 O:020/6       
O:020/7 O:020/7 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 1 Robot Internal Input Robot DI (W) (Grnd) 
O:020/10 O:020/8  Robot DI (X)  (Grnd) 
O:020/11 O:020/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z)- Robot 1 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:020/12 O:020/10 Command Strobe - Robot 1 Robot Internal  
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:020/13 O:020/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 1 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:020/14 O:020/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 1 Robot DI 013 (N) 
O:020/15 O:020/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 1 Robot DI 014 (O) 
O:020/16 O:020/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 1 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:020/17 O:020/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 1 Robot DI 016 (R) 
End Effector Robot1 Robot D1 003 (C) 
Input Ground Robot 1 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
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Output Ground Robot 1 Robot DO (j, k, l, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 1 Robot  (AG) 
 
 
Rack #4 Connections: 
 
RACK #4 (ROBOT 2) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:040/0 I:040/0 R2 Cycle Done  Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:040/1 I:040/1 Pen picked (Done) Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:040/2 I:040/2 Char Done Robot Output Robot DO 003 (s) 
I:040/3 I:040/3 End Effector Error Robot2: Send Robot Output Robot DO 004 (t) 
I:040/4 I:040/4  R2_Healthy     
I:040/5 I:040/5       
I:040/6 I:040/6 Cycle Running - Robot 2 Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:040/7 I:040/7 Error- Robot 2 Robot DO (f) 
I:040/10 I:040/8 At Home- Robot 2 Robot DO (g) 
I:040/11 I:040/9 Unable to move Home -Robot 2 Robot Internal Output Robot DO (h) 
I:040/12 I:040/10 Manipulator power ON- Robot 2 Robot DO 011 (AA) 
I:040/13 I:040/11 Online- Robot 2 Robot DO 012 (AB) 
I:040/14 I:040/12 Manual Mode- Robot 2 Robot DO 013 (AC) 
I:040/15 I:040/13 Cycle stopping- Robot 2 Robot DO 014 (AD) 
I:040/16 I:040/14 Overtime- Robot 2 Robot DO 015 (AE) 
I:040/17 I:040/15 Op Panel Disabled- Robot 2 Robot DO 016 (AF) 
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Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:040/0 O:040/0 Char bit 0/ Pen select 1 Robot Input  Robot DI 001 (A) 
O:040/1 O:040/1 Char bit 1/Pen select 2 Robot Input  Robot DI 002 (B) 
O:040/2 O:040/2 Char bit 2 Robot Input  Robot DI 003 (C) 
O:040/3 O:040/3 Char bit 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 004 (D) 
O:040/4 O:040/4 Char bit 4 Robot Input  Robot DI 005 (E) 
O:040/5 O:040/5 Read Next Char Robot Input  Robot DI 006 (F) 
O:040/6 O:040/6 R2 Error Clear: end effector  Robot Input  Robot DI 009 (I) 
O:040/7 O:040/7 R2 Start Cycle/Pen check done Robot Input  Robot DI 007 (G) 
O:040/10 O:040/8  Robot Internal Input Robot DI (X) (Grnd) 
O:040/11 O:040/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z) - Robot 2 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:040/12 O:040/10 Command Strobe - Robot 2 Robot Internal  
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:040/13 O:040/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 2 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:040/14 O:040/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 2 Robot DI 013 (N) 
O:040/15 O:040/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 2 Robot DI 014 (O) 
O:040/16 O:040/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 2 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:040/17 O:040/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 2 Robot DI 016 (R) 
End Effector Robot 2 Robot DI 008 (H) 
Input Ground Robot 2 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
Output Ground Robot 2 Robot DO (j, k, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 2 Robot  (AG) 
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Rack #1 Connections: 
 
 
RACK #1 (ROBOT 3) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:010/0 I:010/0 R3 Cycle Done  Robot Output Robot DO 001 (q) 
I:010/1 I:010/1 **********Not used********** 
I:010/2 I:010/2 End Effector Error Robot 3 Robot Output Robot DO 002 (r) 
I:010/3 I:010/3       
I:010/4 I:010/4       
I:010/5 I:010/5       
I:010/6 I:010/6 Cycle running- Robot 3 Robot Internal Status 
Output bit  
Robot DO (e) 
I:010/7 I:010/7 Error- Robot 3 Robot DO (f) 
I:010/10 I:010/8 At home- Robot 3 Robot DO (g) 
I:010/11 I:010/9 Unable to move Home -Robot 3 Robot Internal Output Robot DO (h) 
I:010/12 I:010/10 Manipulator power ON- Robot 3 Robot DO 011 (AA) 
I:010/13 I:010/11 Online- Robot 3 Robot DO 012 (AB) 
I:010/14 I:010/12 Manual Mode- Robot 3 Robot DO 013 (AC) 
I:010/15 I:010/13 Cycle stopping- Robot 3 Robot DO 014 (AD) 
I:010/16 I:010/14 Overtime- Robot 3 Robot DO 015 (AE) 
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I:060/17 I:010/15 Op Panel Disabled- Robot 3 Robot DO 016 (AF) 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:010/0 O:010/0 Start Cycle to Robot 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 001 (A) 
O:010/1 O:010/1 Error Clear : Robot 3 Robot Input  Robot DI 002 (B) 
O:010/2 O:010/2 Bad from Vision system (1/0) Camera  output Robot DI 003 (C) 
O:010/3 O:010/3 Good from Vision system (1/0) Camera  output Robot DI 003 (D) 
O:010/4 O:010/4       
O:010/5 O:010/5       
O:010/6 O:010/6 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 2 Robot Internal Input Robot DI (W) ( Grnd) 
O:010/7 O:010/7 Inhibit Move to Home - Robot 3 Robot DI (W) (Grnd) 
O:010/10 O:010/8 Emergency Stop - Robot 3 Robot DI (X) (Grnd) 
O:010/11 O:010/9 Manipulator Power(Y&Z) - Robot 3 Robot DI (Y,Z) 
O:010/12 O:010/10 Command Strobe - Robot 3 Robot Internal 
Command Input bits 
Robot DI (a) 
O:010/13 O:010/11 Command Bit 0 - Robot 3 Robot DI 012 (M) 
O:010/14 O:010/12 Command Bit 1 - Robot 3 Robot DI 013 (N) 
O:010/15 O:010/13 Command Bit 2 - Robot 3 Robot DI 014 (O) 
O:010/16 O:010/14 Command Bit 3 - Robot 3 Robot DI 015 (P) 
O:060/17 O:010/15 Command Bit 4 - Robot 3 Robot DI 016 (R) 
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End Effector Robot 3 Robot D1 004 (D) 
Input Ground Robot 3 Robot DI (S, T, U, V) 
Output Ground Robot 3 Robot DO (j, k, m, n, p) 
Controller Frame Ground Robot 3 Robot  (AG) 
 
 
Rack #6 Connections: 
 
RACK #6 (Conveyor) DC Module 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:060/0 I:060/0 Pallet Present @ Station 0 On Conveyor Proximity sensor 
I:060/1 I:060/1 Pallet Present @ Station 1 
I:060/2 I:060/2 Pallet Present @ Station 2 
I:060/3 I:060/3 Pallet Present @ Station 3 
I:060/4 I:060/4 Pallet Present @ Station 4 
I:060/5 I:060/5 Pallet placed correctly 
I:060/6 I:060/6 Pallet present before st0 Light beam sensor 
I:060/7 I:060/7 Paper Stack Empty On Paper Feeder  
I:060/10 I:060/8 Pen present 1 @ feeder 2 On Pen Feeder 
I:060/11 I:060/9 Pen present 2 @ feeder 2 
I:060/12 I:060/10 Pen present 3 @ feeder 2 
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I:060/13 I:060/11 output 1: pass   Vision System 
I:060/14 I:060/12 output 2: busy   
I:060/15 I:060/13       
I:060/16 I:060/14       
I:060/17 I:060/15       
 
 
Datafile (Octal) PLC Rack  Description  Type External Device 
O:060/0 O:060/0 Motor Running Relay Logic motor 
O:060/1 O:060/1 Trigger     
O:060/2 O:060/2       
O:060/3 O:060/3       
O:060/4 O:060/4       
O:060/5 O:060/5       
O:060/6 O:060/6       
O:060/7 O:060/7       
O:060/10 O:060/8       
O:060/11 O:060/9       
O:060/12 O:060/10       
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O:060/13 O:060/11       
O:060/14 O:060/12       
O:060/15 O:060/13       
O:060/16 O:060/14       
O:060/17 O:060/15       
 
 
Rack #3 Connections: 
 
RACK #3 (Conveyor) AC Module 
Datafile PLC Rack Description Type External Device 
I:030/0 
SA
M
E
 as
 O
C
TA
L
 
Motor Input  relay logic From the start and stop switches 
I:030/1       
I:030/2       
I:030/3       
I:030/4       
I:030/5       
I:030/6       
I:030/7       
I:030/10       
I:030/11       
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I:030/12       
I:030/13       
I:030/14       
I:030/15       
I:030/16       
I:030/17       
 
 
Datafile PLC Rack Description  Type External Device 
O:030/0 
SA
M
E
 as
 O
C
TA
L
 
Stopper at Station0 Pneumatics On Conveyor 
O:030/1 Stopper at Station1 
O:030/2 Stopper at Station2 
O:030/3 Stopper at Station3 
O:030/4 Stopper at Station4 
O:030/5 Clamp at Station1 
O:030/6 Clamp at Station2 
O:030/7 Pneumatic Clamp at Station3 
O:030/10       
O:030/11       
O:030/12       
O:030/13       
O:030/14       
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O:030/15       
O:030/16       
O:030/17       
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Appendix 28: Safety PLC Program 
 
Main Project 1\ SIMATIC 300 (1)\ CPU 315F- 2 PN /DP\ S7 Program (1) 
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